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ARTICLE
EXTRATERRITORIAL CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY: A REMEDY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS?
ERIC ENGLE*
INTRODUCTION
Many business opportunities in the third world are of
questionable legality (e.g. child labor) or are formally illegal (e.g.,
bribery).' Political instability often implicates corporations with
* Professor of Law, University of Tartu, Estonia. J.D., St. Louis University School of
Law; D.E.A., Universite Paris X (Th6orie du Droit); D.E.A., Universite Paris II (Droit
Fiscal); LL.M.Eur., Universitat Bremen, Germany; Dr.Iur, Universitat Bremen, Germany.
Prof. Engle has taught courses on United States tort law and international human rights
law at the UniversitAt Bremen. His research interests are corporate law, human rights,
and legal theory. The author thanks Annika Veldre for her support and encouragement,
and especially thanks the editors and staff of St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary for
augmenting the basic research which supports this article.
1 See Lena Ayoub, Note, Nike Just Does It - and Why the United States Shouldn't: The
United States International Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountable for Their Labor Rights
Violations Abroad, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 395, 400-01 (1999) (chronicling unfair labor
practices perpetrated abroad by United States based multinational corporations); see also
Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, A Coalition of Industrialized Nations,
Developing Nations, Multilateral Development Banks, and Non-Governmental
Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 33 CORNELL
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brutal regimes and even illegal acts. 2 When can a corporation be
implicated as a criminal for such acts? This article examines the
criminal liability of the corporation itself for violations of
international law and of U.S. law outside of U.S. territory. It
also examines the history of the rise of corporate criminal
liability in the common law and civil law as well as theories of
imputed liability in order to show the existence of corporate
criminal liability under customary international law. The
conclusion is that U.S. companies are subject to the law of their
host, U.S. law, and international law. To reach this conclusion,
this article makes some novel arguments about international and
domestic law.
Domestic U.S. laws which this paper examines include the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), as well as Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations and laws. These
are the principal domestic criminal laws whose application to
overseas transactions heard before U.S. courts are likely to
involve corporations. This paper argues that these laws have
extraterritorial effects and that they can be applied not only to
the persons representing or constituting the corporation but also
to the corporation itself.
I. HISTORY AND THEORY OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. History of Corporate Criminal Liability
1. Corporations as Criminals in the Common Law and Civil
Law
Historically a corporation could not be criminally liable in
national law because the corporation was a legal fiction with no
INT'L L.J. 547, 550 (2000) (theorizing that "international business transactions carry the
inherent threat and temptation for bribery and corruption").
2 For an account of corporate facilitation of and complicity with human rights abuses
perpetrated by a corrupt political regime, see Sunita Doddamani, Note, Fighting for the
Right to Hold Multinational Corporations Accountable: Indonesian Villagers Battle Oil
Giant Exxon Mobil, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 835, 835-38 (2003), detailing Exxon Mobil's
employment of the security forces of the Indonesian military dictator General Suharto,
which allegedly perpetrated human rights abuses against Achenese dissidents while
protecting the company's facilities in Aceh, Indonesia.
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independent will. 3 In Anglo-American common law Blackstone
wrote that a corporation cannot commit "treason, or felony, or
other crime, in its corporate capacity."4 In continental civil law
this was also true5 following the maxim "societas delinquere non-
potest."6 One must distinguish between the two different legal
systems.7 However both the civil law (e.g., France, Sweden,
Denmark, Germany 8) and the common law independently
evolved from a principle of no corporate liability toward a
principle that recognizes that corporations can be guilty of
committing crimes 9  in national and international law.10
3 See Michael B. Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products:
Policies, Problems, and Prospects, 73 Geo. L. J. 1, 47-48 (1984) (recounting early common
law view that, inasmuch as a corporation lacked a mind with which to formulate requisite
intent, and a physical form to perpetrate actus reus, a corporation could not be held
criminally liable).
4 Leonard Orland, & Charles Cachera, Corporate Crime and Punishment in France:
Criminal Responsibility of Legal Entities (Personnes Morales) under the New French
Criminal Code (Nouveau Code Pinal), 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 111, 117 (1995) (quoting 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476).
5 See Orland, supra note 4, at 114-17 (explaining traditional French model's rejection
of vicarious imputation of criminal responsibility to corporations because culpability was
viewed as unique to the individual and the model's influence on Western European
nations such as Belgium and the Netherlands).
6 Literally, "corporations cannot commit crimes." Orland, supra note 4, at 115 n.23.
This maxim is the genesis of the traditional French model. Inasmuch as the corporation
lacks a mind with which to formulate a criminal intent, imputation of criminal liability to
corporations was viewed as anathema to the principle that the guilty mind formed the
basis for criminal law. Nor could a corporation commit the actus reus warranting criminal
sanction. See Orland, supra, note 4, at 115-16. Interestingly, the ancien regime did
recognize penal responsibility of corporations. However the bourgeois revolutions'
individualist ideal abolished collective responsibility (e.g. 'corruption of the blood', the
idea that descendants of a criminal are implicated in the ascendant's crime are
unconstitutional in the U.S.). Orland notes that "before the French Revolution...
criminal sanctioning of corporations was generally accepted on the continent" and the "the
French Grande Ordonannce Criminelle of 1670 mentioned the subject in great detail;"
however, "the French Revolution ideal of individualism.., did away with the concept."
Orland, supra note 4, at 115 (quoting Guy Stessens, Corporate Criminal Liability: A
Comparative Perspective, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 493, 494 (1994)).
7 For an extensive discussion of corporate criminal liability in French law, see Orland,
supra note 4 at 114-17. The authors note that beginning in the early 20th century the
American model imputed criminal liability vicariously to the corporate entity for the
culpable acts or omissions of its employees and contrasts this with the French model,
which did not assign corporate liability for crime. Id. at 114-15. Each model respectively
influenced the common law and the civil law. However, the U.S. model has since prevailed
even in France. Id. at 115.
8 See Orland, supra note 4, at 116 (noting that German legal system has not
recognized corporate criminal liability per se, but has implemented a system wherein
administrative bodies may impose fines on corporations).
9 See Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon An
Examination of Forced Labor Cases And Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational
Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 152 (2002) (noting that corporations can commit
international crimes and can therefore be tried nationally).
290 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:2
Corporate criminal liability in both the common law and in civil
law evolved from recognizing individual criminal liability for
wrongful acts of the corporation (first recognizing liability of
directors, then of officers and finally of employees) until finally
recognizing the criminal liability of the corporation itself.i" This
is an example of the contemporary trend toward a convergence of
the common law and civil law.
This evolution may have occurred because until the twentieth
century the principle remedy for crime was imprisonment,
corporal punishment or execution.1 2 Obviously such punishments
could not be applied in any meaningful sense to a corporation.
However, punishment for crime now includes lesser penalties
such as fines, public service, and other non-carceral remedies.
Corporations can also be punished for crimes by being denied the
right to do business with the government or even by revocation of
the company's articles of incorporation.13 Thus, as criminal
punishment evolved, the principle of "no criminal liability" also
evolved dialectically into its opposite. In principle, corporations
today are subject to criminal law in the common law, in civilian
legal systems, and by extension in international law.' 4 Although
it is widely acknowledged that corporations are non-state actors
(and for this reason too were not subject to international criminal
law like individuals),15 they can now be liable for crimes under
10 See generally Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western
Europe Tell Us About American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 89, 107-16 (2004) (summarizing movement amongst various Western European
nations towards adopting corporate criminal liability).
11 See William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L. J. 648,
651-55 (1994) (discussing evolution of corporate criminal liability in United States).
12 See Beale, supra note 10, at 158-59 (noting that European advocates of corporate
criminal liability posit that modern criminal sanctions are more apt to circumscribe the
corporations' potential for harm); Metzger, supra note 3, at 47-48 (noting corporation's
inability to be subjected to imprisonment as contributing to common law's rejection of
corporate criminal liability).
13 See generally Beale, supra note 10, at 159 (detailing alternative European
corporate criminal sanctions, including forced dissolution); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing
Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1141, 1163 n.96 (1983) (enumerating corporate criminal sanctions provided for pursuant
to United States federal law, including dissolution).
14 See Diane Marie Amann, Capital Punishment: Corporate Criminal Liability for
Gross Violations of Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 327, 332 (2001).
Amann also notes the possibility of criminal liability of a corporation in Sweden and
Denmark. Id.
15 See Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights
Law, 5 HARv. HuM. RTS. J. 51, 58 (1992) (noting that "individuals can be punished for
human rights violations during times of war" and specifying that prior to and after
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international law.16 Recognized customary international crimes
include piracy, slave trading, war crimes, crimes against
humanity (that are part of systematic conduct), genocide, and
torture. 17  At least those crimes are subject to universal
jurisdiction18 - meaning any state may punish them.19 The
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime defines further international crimes: participation in an
organized criminal group, money laundering, corruption, and
obstruction of justice.20 State parties must establish criminal,
civil, or administrative liability for legal persons (including
corporations) who commit these crimes.21 Environmental
crimes 22 and air piracy may be in the midst of becoming crimes
under customary international law.
2. Corporate Criminals at the Nuremberg Tribunal
The evolution, from a principle of "no criminal liability" to a
principle where corporations are capable of committing crimes
under international law is revealed in the war crimes trials at
Nuremberg. 23 In the Krupp trial24 it is clear that the corporation
Nuremberg "private individuals had been prosecuted for related violations of the law of
war").
16 See generally Gail Partin, International Criminal Law, ASIL GUIDE TO
ELECTRONIC RESOURCES FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.asil.org/
resource/criml.htm (noting that "most legal scholars agree that a recognizable body of
international criminal law does exist," but that "the precise parameters of this body of law
are often unclear, perhaps due to the rapid and complex developments of our global
society").
17 See Ramasastry, supra note 9, at 153 (listing international crimes).
18 See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 Tex.
L. Rev. 785, 788 (1988) (defining the principle of universal jurisdiction as conferring upon
every state "jurisdiction over a limited category of offenses generally recognized as of
universal concern, regardless of the situs of the offense, and the nationalities of the
offender and the offended").
19 See Ramasastry, supra note 9, at 153 (noting that nature of listed crimes generates
universal jurisdiction).
20 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for
signature Dec. 12, 2000, http://untreaty.un.org/Englishlnotpubl/18-12E.doc [hereinafter
UN Convention]. The treaty has been signed by 147 states, including the United States.
See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Signatories to the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, UN CONVENTION SIGNATORIES, Nov. 8,
2005, http://www.unodc.org/unodclcrime-cicp-signatures. html.
21 See UN Convention, supra note 20.
22 See Robert McLaughlin, Improving Compliance: Making Non-State International
Actors Responsible for Environmental Crimes, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 377,
393 (2000) (noting that the International Law Commission has found certain violations of
the rules concerning environment may qualify as international crimes).
23 See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J. 443, 447 (2001) (positing that trials of German industry
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was implicated in the crimes of its directors.25 Because of the
Krupp firm's desire to employ compulsory labor 26 the tribunal
imputed criminal intent to the corporation - although the court
did not actually declare the Krupp Corporation a criminal
organization. 27
The Farben trial28 also implicated corporations as criminal
instrumentalities. In Farben the court refers to corporate
obligations 29  and treats the corporation as a criminal
instrument.30 Moreover, Nuremberg also recognized that a
corporate body - the state security service (the SD) could be
guilty of a crime. 31 Thus the Nuremberg trials mark a shift from
a principle of "no criminal liability" of corporations to the view
that corporations may be culpable 32 due to the actions (in
historical order of recognition in domestic law) of their board of
directors or of their officers or even, most recently, of their
employees. 33
leaders conducted by American courts sitting in occupied Germany evidenced "the
willingness of key legal actors to contemplate corporate responsibility at the international
level").
24 United States v. Krupp, IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS, at 1327 (1948).
25 See Ramasastry, supra note 9, at 108 (noting lengthy discussion of firm's
involvement in and perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity in tribunal's
decision).
26 See United States v. Krupp, IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, at 1412, 1416.
27 See Ramasastry, supra note 9, at 112 (citing Krupp as an exemplar of judicial
attribution of criminal liability to corporations).
28 United States v. Krauch, et. al, [The I.G. Farben Case], VIII TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS No. 10 (1952).
29 See Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 478 (2002) (positing that court, by focusing on firms
themselves, acknowledged a corporate duty regarding human rights).
30 See Ramasastry, supra note 10, at 106 (commenting on corporation in Farber being
used as instrument of individual actors).
31 See Amann, supra note 24, at 331-32 (highlighting that International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg found several Nazi security services criminally liable).
32 See id. (finding Nuremberg hearings opened door for artificial persons to be guilty
of crime); see also International Council on Human Rights Policy, Beyond Voluntarism:
Human Rights and the Developing International Legal Obligations of Companies, CLEAN
CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, 2002, http://www.cleanclothes.org/ftpfbeyond-voluntarism.pdf
(expanding idea of criminal liability from beyond states to individuals and corporations).
33 JOACHIM VOGEL, ELEMENTE DER STRAFTAT: BEMERKUNGEN ZUR FRANZOSISCHEN
STRAFTATLEHRE UND ZUR STRAFTATLEHRE DES COMMON LAW, GOLTDAMMER'S ARCHIV FOR
STRAFRECHT 127 (1998), (concluding that numerous criminal law systems hold directors
and managers of corporations criminally liable for subordinates' actions).
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B. Legal Bases of Corporate Criminal Liability
1. Mens Rea 34 as a Basis of Corporate Criminal Liability?
Though customary international law is a reflection of state
practice, 35 common law jurists cannot presume that international
law contains common law concepts because the structure and
sources of international law are radically different from the
common law. International law, in its sources and structures,
parallels the civilian legal systems. 36 Mens rea, actus reus, and
ultra vires are basic concepts of common law. Because they are
Latin terms we might be tempted to presume that they are also
found in civilian legal systems and, by extension, in international
law. Surprisingly, this does not seem to be the case! Thus, we
explore these concepts comparatively to see whether they apply
to international law and how they might be found in
international law.
In the common law37 crimes are defined as the union of mens
rea (a criminal intent) and actus reus (a criminal act)38 in one
legal person. The burden of proof in criminal law lies with the
prosecution. 39  However, knowledge of criminality may be
imputed via a "knew or should have known" standard. 40 In
criminal law it is common to impute criminal knowledge to a
34 Some Anglophone commentators think that the common law rule that a criminal
must have both criminal intent (mens rea) and have undertaken a criminal act (actus
reus) is also a principle of international law. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Bakker, The Defense of
Obedience to Superior Orders: The Mens Rea Requirement, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 66
(1989).
35 International Council on Human Rights Policy, supra note 32, at 55 (clarifying that
"international law is traditionally made by states and for states" and that "[i]t aims above
all to bring some order to inter-state relations").
36 See Eric Engle, Alvarez-Machain v. United States and Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa-
The Brooding Omnipresence of Natural Law, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RES.
149, 153 (2005) (finding that "international law resembles the national legal structure of
pre-codification civilian legal systems").
37 The two elements of all common law crimes are actus reus (an act) and mens rea
(culpable intent). Some are willing to impose those concepts on international criminal law.
While mens rea is a general principle of common law and thus is evidence of international
practice, civil law criminal theory could be very different and must at least be consulted
before making such pronouncements. See, e.g., Bakker, supra note 34, at 56.
38 See id. (explaining both war crimes and other crimes require act forbidden by law
as well as guilty or culpable condition of mind).
39 See Ramasastry, supra note 10, at 153 (emphasizing higher burden of proof
imposed on prosecution in criminal cases).
40 See United States v. Parness, 408 F.Supp. 440, 442 (1975) (arguing for new trial
because "government's attorney knew or should have known about material evidence...
[and] the government's attorney had failed to disclose or make such evidence available to
them").
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defendant in cases of their willful blindness as to wrongful
activity. 41 This is because subjective states of mind are
impossible to prove and can only be inferred from objective
manifestations. In the corporate context, if the costs of labor or
goods are so low as to indicate to the corporation that it should
have exercised due diligence to determine that the goods were
not in fact the product of slave or child labor then liability can be
imposed.42 Knowledge will likewise be imputed in cases of
complicity and is defined as actual or constructive knowledge;
that is, the accomplice knew or had reason to know that their act
would assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.43
Historically, one argument against corporate criminal liability
was that the corporation was only a legal person and thus
incapable of forming mens rea for the corporation has no will
independent of its employees and shareholders.44 Today,
however, most jurisdictions now attribute mens rea to a
corporation via its employees, directors or shareholders.45 But
one can doubt whether there is a requirement of mens rea in
international law at all. Although the concept of mens rea does
exist in Quebec law46 (a civil law jurisdiction like Louisiana and
France), criminal law in Canada is federal and thus much more
41 See, e.g., Bakker, supra note 34, at 66 (explaining that obedience to orders can
manifest illegality when action is so obviously illegal).
42 See, e.g. United States v. Lee, 937 F.2d 1388, 1394 (1991) (holding that importation
of fish from Taiwan, illegal under Taiwanese law, was basis of U.S. conviction because
defendant knew or should have known that activity, illegal in Taiwan, would also be
illegal in the U.S.).
43 See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, [1998] ICTY 3, 245 (Dec. 10, 1998), available at
http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/ICTY/1998/3.html (acknowledging it is not required that
accomplice share in mens rea of principal actor).
44 See Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chemical Co., 373 F.
Supp. 2d 7, 54-55 (2005) (citing several law review articles for traditional argument
against imposing corporate liability).
45 See id. at 58 (commenting on need for corporate liability in today's society); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2)(e) (1987) (theorizing that "in
general, a state's exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to a person or thing is
reasonable if, at the time of jurisdiction is asserted: ... the person, if a corporation or
comparable juridical person, is organized pursuant to the law of the state").
46 The maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea" was introduced into French
Canadian law by the English. See Wallace Schwab & Roch Pag6, Locutions Latines
Utilisies En Droit Positif Qujbgcois, http://www.obiter2.ca/B109AH.html (last visited Jan.
18, 2006). The text reads "cette maxime provient du Common law oi on dit que l'intention
et l'acte doivent 6tre en concordance pour constituer un crime, (this maxim comes from
Common law where it is said that the intention and the act must be in agreement to
constitute a crime)." Id. Because Canadian criminal law is federal and essentially
modeled on the common law, the appearance of mens rea and actus reus in Quebec case
law is not especially strong evidence that these principles exist in civilian law and by
extension international law. Id.
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influenced by common law than civil law.47 One finds the term
mens rea only rarely in French and German continental
jurisprudence and usually only in comparative analysis 48 of
domestic law and the common law49 and in fact not at all in
criminal law or corporate criminal law. The concept of mens rea,
however, is entering into the legal thought of the European
Union50 and into international practice51 largely due to
international criminal tribunals. Thus mens rea in international
law may be de lege ferenda - but it is probably not lex lata.52
The common law and civil law did independently evolve from
the position that corporations cannot be liable as criminals
toward a common position that they can. 53 So the more logical
argument for international corporate criminal liability is based
not in a common concept of mens rea but in customary
international law: almost all states recognize a domestic criminal
47 See, e.g., The Queen v. Parent, [2001] S.C.R. 761 (defining common law and
statutory definition of provation and its effect in distinguishing between criminal charge
of murder and manslaugher).
48 See, e.g.,Vogel, supra note 33 (comparing when mens rea is a requirement as
oppose to exceptions where vicarious liability of superiors does not require liability in
French and German criminal law systems).
49 For example, the term "mens rea" does not appear at all in monolingual French or
German dictionaries of law. In a bi-lingual English-German law dictionary suggested
translations of "mens rea" are "subjecktiver Tatbestand", and "Schuldbewusstsein." DORA
VON BESELER & BARBARA JACOBS-WUSTEFELD, LAW DICTIONARY: TECHNICAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL TERMINOLOGY INCLUDING COMMERCIAL & POLITICAL
TERMS: GERMAN-ENGLISH 1056 (1st ed. 1986).
50 See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Criminal-law
Protection of the Financial Interests of the Community and the Establishment of a
European Prosecutor, COM (01)715 FINAL, Nov. 12, 2001, at 40 n.26, http://europa.eu.
intleur-lex/encomlgpr/2001/com200l_0715en01.pdf (confirming the acceptance of criminal
liability for corporations for all the Member States); see also Action Brought on 18
January 1999 by HFB Holding ffir Fernwdrmetechnik Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH &
Co. KG and Others against the Commission of the European Communities (HFB Holding
ffir Fernwiirmetechnik Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG and Others v.
Commission), 1999 J.O. (C 86) 24, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/
1999/c_086/c_08619990327en00240025.pdf (pleading "infringement of Article 6(2) of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the principle of mens rea under Article 15(2)
of Regulation No 17/62").
51 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
316 (2003) (explaining mens rea requirement for corporate liability in international law).
52 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 459 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "de lege ferenda," a latin
phrase meaning "from law to be passed" as "a proposed principle that might be applied to
a given situation instead or in the absence of a legal principle that is in force"); BECK'S
LAw DICTIONARY: A COMPENDIUM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.people.virginia.
edu/-rjb3v/latin.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (defining "lex lata" as "what the law is
(as opposed to what the law should be)").
53 See generally Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 315 (noting that
Nuremburg trials were root in common law for imposing criminal liability against
corporations).
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liability of corporations5 4 - and that can be seen as the state
practice and opinio juris needed to form an international custom.
A similar evolution may be occurring as to the concept of mens
rea. However it is questionable whether such an evolution has
occurred with the concept of ultra vires.
2. Imputed Liability
Any criminal act imputed to the corporation will in fact have
been done by a natural person or persons. If the corporation is to
be liable as a criminal then the wrongful act of a human must
somehow be attributed to the corporation. Criminal liability can
be imputed to a corporation based on a theory of agency, or on a
theory of identity, or through accomplice liability (complicity).55
The theory of agency56 imposes liability on the company for the
wrongful acts of its employees. This is also known as vicarious
liability57 or attribution theory.58 This theory permits the
corporation to be sued for mala prohibita.59 Alternatively, the
theory of identification 60 imputes liability on the corporation for
blameful conduct of an officer or director, thereby allowing
54 See generally Jens David Ohlin, Is the Concept of a Person Necessary for Human
Rights?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 227 (2005) (noting recognition of rights of corporations
in tax realm and in other areas has spurred a push for domestic and international
criminal liability for corporations).
55 See Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COP.
L. 455, 456 (2001) (commenting that international criminal law is more hospitable when
it comes to the doctrine of complicity and other forms of vicarious liability); see also
Kendel Drew and Kyle A. Clark, Twentieth Survey of White Collar Crime, 42 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 277, 280 (2005) (clarifying that the agency relationship is established for criminal
liability purposes when employee acts within scope of employment).
56 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) AGENCY, §
1 (1958) (defining agency as "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other so to act").
57 See Ramasastry, supra note 10, at 155 n.267 (describing how some common law
systems have resolved issue of "imputing the acts of a natural person to a corporation" by
"adopting vicarious liability").
58 See id. (defining attribution as "identification of the acts of those representing the
corporate 'mind' or 'will' as acts of the corporation").
59 Mala prohibita are acts that are "crime[s] merely because [they are] prohibited by
statute, although the act[s] [themselves are] not necessarily immoral." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 971 (7th ed. 1999). Mala prohibita have also been defined as acts which are
"made offenses by positive laws, and prohibited as such." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 956
(6th ed. 1990).
60 See Ramasastry, supra note 10, at 155 n.267 (referencing H.L. Bolton (Eng'g.) Co.
Ltd. v. Graham & Sons Ltd., 1 Q.B. (1957), for the United Kingdom's version of the
identification principle known as "the directing mind doctrine").
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prosecution for mala in se.6 1 In a theory of identification the
corporate veil is pierced. This means the distinction between the
corporation and its officers, directors and even shareholders may
be ignored. In civilian jurisdictions as well, criminal liability can
be imputed to corporations under various statutes in 62 for
criminal acts which are mala in se.6 3
A corporation, just like a natural person, may be liable directly
(via the agency and identity theories) or as an accomplice for
violations of international law,64 as expressed in custom, treaty,
or jus cogens.6 5 The theory of complicity is more complex than the
agency or identity theory, and I will therefore explore it more
thoroughly in the following paragraphs.
3. Accomplice Liability
Corporations can be criminally liable as an accomplice to
criminal acts of others (aiding and abetting the commission of a
crime).66 Culpable actions may range from indirect complicity to
direct complicity to actual commission of wrongful acts. 67
Accomplice liability will arise out of "practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support"68 in obtaining the criminal
61 See id. (describing how acts and mens rea of employee can become acts and mens
rea of corporation).
62 See id. (explaining that civil law jurisdictions have enacted legislation providing for
application of "specific penal laws to legal persons").
63 Mala in se are "act[s] that [are] inherently immoral, such as murder, arson, or
rape," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 971 (7th ed. 1999), while Mala in se are described as
"[w]rongs in themselves" or "acts morally wrong" or "offenses against conscience," BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 956 (6tb ed. 1990). For example, parking violations are mala prohibita;
there is nothing inherently evil about a car being in a metered parking space but when
the meter runs out, the act becomes wrongful by operation of positive law. In contrast,
drunken driving is a mala in se; the act is inherently evil because the drunken driver
cannot properly judge his speed or the distance of objects and, thus, kills people. Further,
the mala in se and mala prohibita distinction parallels that of natural law and positive
law. Because mala in se are evils so wrong that they are inscribed on the heart of all
living beings, they are naturally recognized by all as wrongs, need not be declared by the
legislator to be evil, and may be banned ex post facto. On the other hand, mala prohibita
are only positive wrongs and, thus, are wrong merely by operation.
64 See Ramasastry, supra note 10, at 100 (including accomplice liability as one of
three ways in which a corporation could be liable for violating international guidelines).
65 See Partin, supra note 16, at 1 (declaring international criminal law as being
derived from general principles of international law, customary law, and treaties).
66 See Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human
Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 342-43 (2001) (positing that
corporation could be accomplice in human rights violation if it violates customary
international law principles).
67 See id. at 342 (noting that it is not necessary for accomplice to intend eventual,
criminal result).
68 Id. at 345.
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object. There are three types of complicity under which a
corporation can be held liable.69 In descending order of likelihood
of criminal conviction these are: 1) direct corporate complicity, 2)
beneficial complicity, and 3) silent complicity. Direct corporate
complicity70 occurs when a corporation directly participates in
illegal acts that involve intentional participation - the intent to
commit the act, but not necessarily the consequences of the act.71
In beneficial complicity, corporations may also be liable as
accomplices merely due to benefiting72 from the principal's acts.
Corporations could even be liable for merely passively, but
knowingly, benefiting from a regime that systematically violates
human rights. Finally, silent complicity73 occurs where a
corporation does not verify complaints of human rights abuses or
protest against human rights abuses. Of the three forms of
complicity, silent complicity is least likely to support a criminal
conviction. 74 Active complicity will be more culpable than passive
complicity when endeavouring to find criminal liability. 75
Although assistance does not need to be the causae sine qua
non76 of the principal's criminal act, 7 7 the accomplice must have
had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.78
69 See Ramasastry, supra note 10, at 101 (denoting the three types of complicity for
which multi-national corporations might be held liable).
70 See Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 66, at 342 (noting direct participation requires
"intentional participation").
71 See id. at 342 (saying that "only knowledge of the foreseeable harmful effects" is
required to be a direct participant).
72 See id. at 346 (identifying situations where complicity found by business receiving
benefit from "human rights abuses" of another).
73 See id. at 347-48 (explaining that notion of silent complicity stems from
expectation that companies alert proper authorities to known human rights abuses based
on principle that "[s]ilence is not neutrality").
74 See id. at 348 (viewing silent complicity more as moral issue than as issue likely to
be pursued and penalized by respective governing authority).
75 See generally Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 66, at 341 (working from premise that
levels of complicity mirror levels of complicity likely to be attributed to offending
corporation).
76 A causae sine qua non is a "[a] necessary cause; the cause without which the thing
cannot be or the event could not have occurred." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 211 (7th ed.
1999). It has also been described as "[a]n indispensable requisite or condition." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1385 (6th ed. 1990).
77 See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96 -23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, 391 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/focal
trialc2/judgementlindex.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (stating that "[t]he act of
assistance need not have caused the act of the principal").
78 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. ICTY-94-1-T, 688 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former
Yugoslavia, May 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadicltrialc2/judgement/
index.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2006) (explaining that in order to be held responsible
individual must know that they are assisting in commission of crime).
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Corporate accomplice liability also arises in the context of
intentional torts. In Doe v. Unocal,7 9 the court held that a
corporation could be liable in tort under the Alien Tort Claims
Act for aiding and abetting a government's use of forced labor.
Active participation was not necessary for guilt to be imputed to
the corporation.SO A prosecutor could argue by analogy that this
holding should apply to a criminal case against a corporation.
a. Criminal Principals
Guilt as an accomplice necessarily implies a principal
perpetrator. However, a corporation can be held liable as an
accomplice to crime even where the identity of the principal
perpetrator is unknown.S1 This is true in both common law and
civilian legal systems 8 2 and will therefore likely be true in
international law as well.
b. Limitations of Accomplice Liability
There are however, limitations on corporate accomplice
liability.8 3 Not every immoral action will give rise to guilt as an
accomplice. For example, a banker lending money to a criminal
will not necessarily be liable as an accomplice for the crimes of
his debtor. This was demonstrated at Nuremberg,8 4 and has
been affirmed more recently in litigation over dormant Swiss
bank accounts held by victims of the National Socialist
79 John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated by 395 F.3d 978
(9th Cir. 2003). The court in John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003),
later determined that this case would be reheard by the 9th Circuit en bane, and that the
earlier decision will only be cited to the extent consistent with the en bane rehearing. Id.
80 See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 948 (finding that District Court "erred" in applying "active
participation" standard).
81 See Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 66, at 342 (clarifying that neither identity of
principal perpetrator nor proven guilt of principal perpetrator need be proven for
corporation to be found criminally liable under theory of direct complicity).
82 See id. at 343 (noting crime itself need not be known to accomplice in order to be
criminally liable).
83 See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Symposium, Holding Multi-National Corporations
Responsible Under International Law, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 293 (2001)
(acknowledging that while multinational corporations may be held liable for intentional
human rights violations, "it is uncertain whether corporations may also be held liable for
silent complicity in human rights abuses").
84 See United States v. von Weizsaecker [The Ministries Case], XIV TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
NO. 10, at 621-22 (1949).
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internment.8 5 In both cases, the creditor was exonerated from
criminal responsibility.
4. Corporate Groups
The distinctive regulatory problem posed by MNCs [Multi-
National Corporations] is their ability to operate an
integrated command and control system through two
disaggregated institutional structures. The first of these
structures is the collection of discrete corporate units -
parent, subsidiary, sister, and cousin companies - that make
up the MNC group. The second disaggregated structure
housing the MNC is the global system of separate nation-
states in which those corporations are registered and do
business.8 6
Corporate entities often try to structure their operations to
disguise the fact that they profit from human rights abuses 87 by
using subsidiary business associations or by sub-contracting
illegal acts. However, courts are willing to pierce the corporate
veil8 8 and impute legal responsibility to a holding company or its
managers, directors, and employees for the acts of its
subsidiaries8 9 either in crime, tort, or both. The problem of
outsourcing crime through sub-contracting can be addressed
through a theory of accomplice liability. Head office liability for
acts of subsidiaries and subcontractors is fair because "many
MNCs [Multi-National Corporations] can and do operate their
many parts with a coherence ... that resembles a single entity..
controlled neither by international law nor the legal norms of
85 See Ramasastry, supra note 10, at 112-13 (holding that "the mere act of providing
credit to finance criminal activities does not constitute a violation of customary
international law, even where the bank had knowledge of the purpose for such
financing").
86 Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is
Tort Law the Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 399, 401 (2002).
87 See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility In An Era Of Economic
Globalisation, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 705, 769 (2002) (describing problem of "judgment
proof' companies in third world held by or trading with solvent first world companies).
88 See, e.g., Case 286/98 P, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB v. Commission, 2000
E.C.R. 1-09925, para. 79 (2000) (stating that legal personalities of subsidiary companies
are not sufficient to prevent liability of the parent company).
89 See Danielle Everett, New Concern For Transnational Corporations: Potential
Liability For Tortious Acts Committed By Foreign Partners, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1123,
1124-27 (1998) (noting that Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997),
implies potential parent liability for tortious acts of subsidiaries and expressing concerns
as to limits of such liability).
2006] EXTRATERRUORJAL CORPORATE CRIMINAL LLABILITY 301
any single state."90 Thus, it is not a case of multiple theories of
liability imposed on one entity (tort/human rights; respondeat
superior/complicity); rather, it is a case of imposing liability
where otherwise none would exist, namely over multinational
enterprises. 9 1
In sum, U.S. corporations can be criminally liable before a U.S.
court for its illegal acts overseas. However, criminal liability of
head offices for crimes committed in the underdeveloped world by
their partners, subsidiaries, or host governments is in practice
the exception. 92 This may be because prosecutors are unaware of
just how far the long arm of the law reaches.
C. Ultra Vires as a Basis of Corporate Criminal Liability under
International Law?
1. Theoretical Arguments for Corporate Criminal Liability
a. The Contract and Delegation Theories
One theory to justify imposing criminal liability on
corporations is the theory of delegation or contract. 93 The
delegation theory argues that because the state delegates its
authority to the corporation, the corporation must not act
contrary to the norms that bind the state.94 As a creation of the
state, the corporation is bound by at least those norms that bind
its creator. The essence of this theory is that a state may not
accomplish indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly. 95
90 Anderson, supra note 86, at 402.
91 See Berthold Goldman, Multinational Enterprises, JUSTITIA ET PACE INSTITUT DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 7, 1977, http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1977_oslo_
02 en.pdf (clarifying that "enterprises which consist of a decision-making centre located
in one country and of operating centres, with or without the legal personality, situated in
one or more countries should, in law, be considered as multinational enterprises").
92 See, e.g., Amann, supra note 14, at 333 (commenting that Chevron and Unocal
were never prosecuted by the U.S. government or the State of California for human rights
abuse in the third world).
93 See generally Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis Of
Corporate Illegality (With Notes On How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International
Law Norms), 87 VA L. REV. 1279, 1279-92 (2001) (positing that decision to violate
international laws should be based on costs of violating the law (citing Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982))).
94 See Greenfield, supra note 93, at 1329-30 (acknowledging that corporation's power
is derived from the state).
95 See id. at 1329-30 (noting "a state has no authority to authorize anyone, including
a corporation, to engage in acts that are illegal in another jurisdiction").
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Similarly, the contractual theory argues that corporations make
a contract with the state: In exchange for limited liability, the
corporation agrees to act legally and to serve the public interest
which includes the protection of human rights. 96
b. Ultra Vires as a Contract Theory
Ultra vires97 is an expression of a contractual theory of the
corporation. Literally, it means the corporation may not act
beyond its powers. That is, ultra vires is a principle of common
law in which a corporation may not undertake any acts not
authorized by its articles of incorporation or any acts that are
illegal 98 because the corporation's privileges (legal personality,
and limited liability) were granted by the state the corporation
may not violate the laws of the state,99 including the states'
obligations under international law.100 From this perspective the
corporation has a duty to act lawfully even outside the
jurisdiction where it is incorporated101 and thus can be held
liable within its jurisdiction of incorporation for its unlawful
foreign acts.
2. Problems with Ultra Vires in International Law
a. The Contract and Delegation Theories Invert the
Historical Argument against Corporate Criminal
Liability
One possible argument against basing corporate liability on a
theory of ultra vires (that the corporation could not commit the
act that was beyond the scope of its powers) is that historically,
the legal concept of ultra vires was exactly the justification for
finding that the corporation would not be liable. The logic was
96 See id. at 1326-28 (concluding that interests of both the state and the corporation
are better served by compliance with the law).
97 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1525 (7th ed. 1999) (defining ultra vires as
"unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by
law").
98 See Greenfield, supra note 93, at 1280-81 (stating corporations are not authorized
under charters to act unlawfully).
99 See id. at 1281-83 (noting that corporations are bound to act in accordance with,
not only laws of the corporation, but with laws of the state).
100 See id. at 1282-83 (arguing that obligation to abide by law extends beyond
jurisdiction of incorporation to foreign jurisdictions).
101 See id. at 1373 (interpreting doctrine of ultra vires as meaning "corporations have
the duty, as a matter of domestic corporate law, to act lawfully even in foreign nations").
2006] EXTRATERR!TORLAL CORPORATE CRJMJNAL LIABILITY 303
that the corporation could not even commit an act for which it
was not empowered102 and thus the criminal act could not be
imputed to the corporation. The result was that liability would
only be found among the natural persons. Contemporary law has
inverted this proposition, 103 so the argument, though logical, will
not likely be accepted.
b. Common Law Concepts are not an Integral Part of
International Law
The problem with arguing for ultra vires as a basis of criminal
liability in international law is that though ultra vires is an
integral part of the common law it is not part of the civilian legal
system. International law parallels civilian legal systems, not
the common law. The hierarchy of norms in international law -
the sources and weights of legal authority - is very different than
in domestic U.S. law.104 General principles of law, which exist
only vestigially, if at all, in equity's legal maxims, are a key
element of international law where they are a source of law.105
Legal scholarship is also a source of international law. There is
no doctrine of stare decisis in international law. Each case in
international law addresses only the parties before it. At best,
international case law is merely evidence of international custom
or treaty.106 If ultra vires is not found in the civilian legal
systems then that is a strong argument that it does not exist in
international law either.
102 See Ramasastry, supra note 10, at 155 n.267 (discussing difficulties in finding
requisite mens rea to commit crime for fictional entity).
103 See id. at 155 n.267 (stating that some jurisdictions attribute mens rea of
employee to corporation).
104 See Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond the Domestic-International Divide:
Toward a Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 155, 193 n.5 (2004)
(acknowledging domestic laws generally arise from constitutions and legislation while
international law is from treaties and international custom).
105 See Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Hierarchy of International Law
Sources and Norms: Hierarchy of Norms and Human Rights: Of Trumps and Winners, 65
SASK. L. REV. 299, 322 (2002) (discussing peremptory norms as a source of customary
international law).
106 See 1945 I.C.J. Acts & Docs 59, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon
decade/decad026.htm#art59 (clarifying "the decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case").
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3. Arguing for Ultra Vires in International Law
The best ways to find a rule in international law that
corporations must obey the laws of their chartering states
wherever they operate would be to argue from the general
principles of law, specifically the duty of good faith and fair
dealing and the principle of legality. Alternatively or additionally
one could argue by analogies from the common law. These
arguments follow.
a. Arguing for Ultra Vires from General Principles of
International Law
The general principles of law are a source of law in public
international law (jus gentiumlO7) and the civilian legal system.
A plausible argument could be made that a common law
proposition is an expression of some general principle of law
though not articulated as such in the common law. By linking
the common law concept to a general principle of international
law a common law concept not found in civilian law systems
could be found to exist in international law. 108 This creative
argument is not made because the general principles of law are
not a source of law in the domestic legal order of the common law
jurisdictions and so common law lawyers are unfamiliar with the
general principles of law as a source of law.
b. Arguing for Ultra Vires as a Part of Customary Law
Another argument for finding a common law concept in
international law would be to look at the common law as
evidence of international customary law. Customary
international law consists of two elements: practice (what states
actually do) and opinio juris (what states believe they ought to
do).109 Domestic law is evidence of both opinio juris and state
107 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 865 (7th ed. 1999) (defining jus gentium as "the law of
nations").
108 1945 I.C.J. 38, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decad026.
htm#art38 (stating "the Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: .. .the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations").
109 See George E. Edwards, International Human Rights Law Challenges to the New
International Criminal Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy, 26 YALE J. INT'L
L. 323, 388-89 (2001) (stating "two elements must be present for a principle or rule of
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practice. 110 If an overwhelming majority of states recognize
corporate criminal liability in their domestic law (and they do),
then a very good argument can be made that corporations can
also be criminally liable under customary international law.
4. Conclusions
a. The Status of Ultra Vires in International Law is
Unresolved
The status of ultra vires in international law is not resolved
and is still being discussed in comparative law literature.1 1
Ultra vires is not a principle of German corporate law.112 The
idea of "ultra vires" has only been recognized in German law for
public law entities.11 3 Moreover, ultra vires does not appear to
exist in French law (the maxim "ultra vires hereditatis" exists in
customary international law to exist: (1) state practice as proof of custom; and (2) opinio
juris vel necessitatis (opinio juris)").
110 Id. at 389 (defining internal law of relevant states as proof of "state practice"
element and explaining that opinio juris "requires an examination of a State's motives in
engaging in a particular act or practice").
111 The problem of ultra vires in international law is complicated by the fact that
ultra vires is both a common law principle of corporations and of public entities. The
indifferent application of a legal theory to a private artificial legal person and a public one
is essentially contrary to civilian legal theory, which sees a strict split between
interpretations of private and public laws and definitive attributions of powers and
limitations to artificial persons based on their status as public or private. Under classic
international law, a corporation would not be recognized as having any legal personality
because states are the only subjects of international law. Thus, in the corporate sense,
ultra vires could have no application in the international arena. Furthermore,
international law has long recognized that a state is liable internationally for its acts
regardless of its internal legal order and will be held responsible for its wrongs even if
those wrongful acts were also, in the internal order, legal and constitutional. Therefore,
ultra vires really had no place in the international system. For an example of a common
law lawyer who, citing to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, reaches the correct
result - that ultra vires, as to states, is irrelevant to the question of state liability to other
states see Theodor Meron, State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 83 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC., 372, 375-76 (1989). To read Mizushima Tomonori, a Japanese civil
law legal scholar's view that ultra vires does not apply to states because a state can be
liable internationally even for those acts which it undertakes in violation of its own laws
see Mizushima Tomonori, Holland and Hart Private International Law Award: The
Individual as Beneficiary of State Immunity: Problems of the Attribution of Ultra Vires
Conduct, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 261, 277-78 (2001).
112 See Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models Of Modern Corporations: A Comparative
Analysis Of German And U.S. Corporate Structure, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 555, 568
(2000) (stating German law has no equivalent to the ultra vires doctrine).
113 See Michael Grunson & Uwe H. Schneider, The German Landesbanken, 1995
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 337, 376 (1995) (noting while ultra vires is not recognized for
German corporations, the German Supreme Court has applied the doctrine twice when
certain public law entities acted outside their function as defined by law).
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French law),114 and unlike legal maxims in common law, which
only have legal weight before a court of equity, the legal maxims
in French law are evidence of the law. The French legal maxim,
however, refers not to a principle of corporate or municipal law,
but rather to the principle that an heir or corporate associate will
be liable for the debts of their legator or other shareholders.115
Although ultra vires may not exist in international law, the
"general principle of legality" (principe gdn~raux de la lggalite')116
does exist as a general principle of law in French law and in
international law. The general principle of legality under
international law applies to corporations.11 7
The legal concept of ultra vires forces a corporation chartered
under the common law to obey domestic and customary
international law outside of U.S. territory, and even the law of
the host jurisdiction and international treaties.118 One cannot
presume, however, that a similar rule exists in other states. One
must prove it through painstaking comparative scholarship
through the examination of state practice, as well as case law
and the works of scholars secondarily. One would have to ask
whether, for example, an AG119 or a SARL120 operating outside of
114 See RAYMOND GUILLIEN ET AL., LEXIQUE DE TERMES JURIDIQUES 384 (4th ed.
1978).
115 See GERARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 847 (6th ed. 1996).
116 The general principles of law are like axioms and postulates of the law. They are
true of any civil law jurisdiction. Thus, for example, the principle of legality implies nul
crimen sine lege (there can be no crime where there is no law); the principle of equality
implies that all persons are equal before the law; the principle of self defense means that
one has the right to an attorney. Aside from international law and vestigial through the
maxims of equity, general principles of law simply do not exist as a source of law in the
common law. The nearest parallel in the U.S. is the idea of "fundamental rights;"
however, the overlap between "fundamental rights" and "general principles of law" is only
partial. For comparison, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 (4) (1987), which allows common general principles of law to be
invoked to supplement the rules of international law.
117 See generally James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate
Governance and United States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 29-67
(1995) (discussing structure and transformation of French corporate governance).
118 See Greenfield, supra note 93, at 1373 (proposing that if ultra vires were applied,
a shareholder could sue a corporation for breaking the law of a foreign country).
119 The German Aktiengesellschaft (AG) is similar to a corporation or to the French
SNC (Socidtj en nom Collectif). The AG and SNC find their equivalent in the archaic but
still existing "joint stock company." They are partnerships with limited liability, but
alienable shares. For a discussion on AG see David J. Berger, Guidelines for Mergers and
Acquisitions in France, Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 484, 500-01 (1991). For an explanation of
the nature of the AG and tracing its origins to early British joint stock companies see
Ingrid Lynn Lenhardt, Eighth Annual Corporate Law Symposium: Limited Liability
Companies: The Corporate And Tax Advantages of Limited Liability Company: A German
Perspective, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 551 (1996).
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Germany or France, respectively, must obey the laws of its
chartering jurisdiction, its host jurisdiction, or both. Multi-
national corporations often include parent companies in, say, the
U.S. and a subsidiary in Germany so this question is not merely
of theoretical interest.
It would be desirable, of course, to find a principle like ultra
vires in the general principle of legality. Requiring corporations
to obey the laws of both its host jurisdiction and domestic
jurisdiction (ignoring, for the moment, collisions of those rules)
would serve the best interest of the shareholders121 and the
public because the corporation would no longer be free to abuse
the law. Finding ultra vires internationally through the general
principle of legality would increase the security of transactions
and reduce abuses of human rights. 122 However, the existence of
ultra vires (or mens rea) as legal concepts in international law
cannot simply be presumed because that would ignore: 1)
whether other national legal orders even have such a principle; 2)
whether a state applies the principle outside of its own territory;
and, 3) if so, whether, in determining an act to be ultra vires or
finding mens rea, the state in question uses its own law, the law
of the corporation's state of incorporation, or the law of the place
of the transaction or international law.
b. Ultra Vires in International Law is at Best de Lege
Ferenda
Internationally, ultra vires and mens rea are probably de lege
ferenda123 and not de lege lata.124 Without specific proof of such a
principle existing in the national legal orders of civil law
120 Socidtd Anonyme avec Responsabilitd Limitg (SARL), an anonymous association
with limited liability, is, in other words, a corporation. The SARL is one French
equivalent of the corporation. For further explanation of the nature of a SARL see Berger,
supra note 119, at 495-96.
121 See Greenfield, supra note 93, at 1372-73 (explaining application of ultra vires in
international sense would allow shareholder to hold corporation to contractual obligation
even if the host government was unwilling to do so).
122 See Greenfield, supra note 93, at 1373-74 (suggesting ultra vires would offer
remedy against corporations who violate international customary law, decreasing abuses
of human rights).
123 "A principle created to apply to a given situation, rather than from existing
precedents; law created for changing circumstances." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 438 (7th
ed. 1999).
124 "Existing law. The principle that a court should decide based on actual law and
not on how it thinks the law ought to be." Id.
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jurisdictions or existing under international law, these principles
would only be persuasive arguments of what the law should be as
opposed to what it actually is. The better argument is to rely
directly on the general principles of international law.
D. Arguments Against Corporate Criminal Liability
Theoretical objections to transnational corporate liability can
be found. These objections include economic and moral
arguments. Neither are they particularly persuasive.
1. Economic Arguments
The common law has not encouraged the idea that a
corporation owes any duty to society, 125 other than to maximize
profit of its shareholders.126 Milton Friedman agrees with this
early view of general corporate immunity and argues that in a
world of competition and self-interest, there is one and only one
social responsibility of business, which is to increase profits.1 2 7
The corporation, however, must act legally.128 Further, in Herald
Co. v. Seawell,129 the federal appellate court held that among a
court's discretionary powers is the power to act in the public
interest, even if that negatively impacts shareholder
distributions. This demonstrates that courts impute legal duties
to corporations beyond that of profit maximization. 130
A more sophisticated view looks beyond Friedman's neo-
classical theory and empirically examines what businesses do in
practice. An examination of business practice reveals that
125 See Comment, Herald Co. v. Seawell: A New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 1157, 1157 (1973) (proposing there is lack of social responsibility in
corporate realm).
126 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (positing that
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for profit of stockholders).
127 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1971)
(1962) (advancing notion that corporation has sole responsibility of increasing profits of
shareholders).
128 See id. at 133 (stating corporations must "stay within the rules of the game" when
seeking to increase its profits); see also Greenfield, supra note 93, at 1281-82
(emphasizing often overlooked requirement that articles of incorporation require charter
corporations only for lawful purposes).
129 Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
130 See id. at 1095 (acknowledging that defendant corporation, not unlike other
corporations, has duty to its employees over and above maximizing profit).
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corporations are increasingly socially conscious.131 However
social policy is ambiguous and verifying whether directors are
implementing these policies in the public interest is difficult.132
The extreme view of Professor Milton Friedman is that
corporations have only one duty of profit maximization, which is
empirically untrue.133 Corporations do not only exist to make
money; they also exist to produce goods, to pay their employees
and even, shockingly, to do charitable works (particularly where
those are compensated by tax advantages). Friedman's view
simply ignores the social functions of a corporation and wrongly
ascribes a single-minded purpose to what is obviously a multi-
faceted phenomenon.
In practice, corporate liability exists and is expanding. This can
be seen in imputed liability of a corporation for the acts of its
employees via respondeat superior,134 in the nullification of the
fellow servant rule (wherein an employee victim of a tort would
have no remedy against the employer where the tort-feasor was a
"fellow servant"), 135 and in strict products liability in tort.136 Just
as formalistic procedural obstacles, such as sovereign immunity
and the act of state doctrine, have been increasingly qualified or
even abandoned in national and even international law, so also
131 See Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory
Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 261 (2002) (suggesting that progressive corporate practices may
become more common because they make good business sense rather than out of
altruism).
132 Cf. Claire Moore Dickerson, How Do Norms and Empathy Affect Corporation Law
and Corporate Behavior?: Human Rights: The Emerging Norm Of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1431, 1459 (2002) (suggesting that directors face lower
risk of liability for human rights violations in U.S. courts than for violating duties to
shareholders, but holding out hope that there is growing trend for liability for human
rights violations).
133 See id. at 1432 (noting that, in actual behavior, corporations are moving beyond
the classic model of limited social responsibility and that "[a]s a matter of conduct,
multinationals recognize the rights of persons other than shareholders").
134 "The doctrine holding an employer or principal liable for the employee's or agent's
wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or agency." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999).
135 See id. at 632 (defining rule).
136 See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When Should Corporations be
Held Criminally Liable?, 37 A. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1246 (2000) (explaining strict liability
imposes liability on corporation for acts or omissions of its agents, whenever these acts or
omissions result in harm); see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 2001, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 78 (2002) (holding that through adoption of strict
liability laws, Texas has expressed interest in protecting its consumers while
simultaneously regulating products in stream of commerce).
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has the scope of legal protection of human rights broadened by
the recognition of corporate criminal liability.137
Economic arguments cut both ways. Corporate criminal
liability can be justified for reasons of economic efficiency.
Criminal liability forces corporations to internalize external
costs, which they would otherwise externalize on third parties.138
However, this is inefficient for the market as a whole.1 39 If the
only moral duty of a corporation is to make a profit, then there
would be no need for legal regulation at all. Because
corporations have legal duties other than profit maximization,
Professor Friedman's extreme theory of corporate irresponsibility
does not correspond to empirical reality and must be rejected.
The very fact that corporations seriously argue for no regulation
whatsoever should raise suspicions.
2. Moral Arguments
More sophisticated arguments against corporate criminal
liability adopt positions that are more or less consciously based
on moral relativism. The least self-conscious relativist argument,
like Friedman's, states that corporations lack the resources or
expertise needed to make moral judgements.14 0  Another
relativist argument is that the corporation should remain neutral
in the political and cultural affairs of its host state, except in as
far as they directly affect business.141 An extreme and
137 See Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of
Prosecuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F. L. REV. 167, 214 (2005) (noting that recognition of
corporate criminal and civil liability, has allowed victims of human rights abuses to better
vindicate rights).
138 See Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of
Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U.L. 395, 397-98 (1991) (arguing that optimal penalties for
corporate criminal liability set at level which reflects costs to society forces economic
agents to internalize total cost of activities rather than force society to bear costs of
harm).
139 See id. at 398 (stating that calculating fines based on harm to society promotes
the most efficient result).
140 See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Bellotti and the Question of Corporate Moral Agency, 1988
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 683, 687-89 (1988) (positing that corporations are incapable of
exercising moral freedom because they are ultimately controlled by their structures).
141 See Demian Betz, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible for Human
Rights Abuses Committed by Security Forces in Conflict Ridden Nations: An Argument
Against Exporting Federal Jurisdiction for the Purpose of Regulating Corporate Behaviour
Abroad, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 163, 164 (2001) (advancing theory that investments of
multinational corporations are politically neutral and should not influence behavior of
sovereign nations).
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duplicitous argument is that corporations' interference in their
host states internal politics would be cultural imperialism. That
concern only seems to arise when the "interference" would be
unprofitable; in other words, when such "interference" is
profitable no one complains. None of these arguments are
particularly persuasive because corporations have plenty of
resources and are not blind or run by idiots with no moral
compass. Corporations regularly intervene in domestic affairs of
host nations. 142
E. Theoretical and Practical Explanations for the Rise of
Corporate Criminal Liability
1. Theories Justifying Corporate Criminal Liability
The usual justifications for corporate criminal liability,
whether in national or international law, are generally referred
to as retribution, deterrence,143 and sometimes restitution or
compensation; 144 although, these last two justifications occur
more often in tort law. 145 The significance of these categories is
that in civilian legal systems criminal laws do not generally have
a compensatory function and tort laws (delicts) do not generally
have a punitive function. 146 Because international law parallels
civilian legal systems it also assigns tort law a compensatory
function and criminal law a punitive function and applies a strict
142 See generally Dickerson, supra note 132, at 1432-33 (noting both Nike and Wal-
Mart have adopted codes of conduct to articulate concern and regulate the working
conditions of developing country workers); Ramasastry, supra note 10, at 93-94
(examining history of corporate liability for forced labor and arguing that MNCs should be
either criminally or tortuously liable for egregious abuses of human rights).
143 See Ratner, supra note 29, at 464-65 (explaining deterrence rationale, as applied
to corporate criminal liability, places incentives to curb human rights violations on party
with greatest ability and interest in addressing corporate conduct).
144 See Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POLe 833, 840-41 (2000) (citing Kant for proposition that "the state must
punish individuals who violate the law because they have violated the law and only
because they have violated the law - without regard, that is, for the consequences that
might flow from the imposition of punishment").
145 See Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA.
L. REV. 327, 340 (2004) (referring to Restatement of Torts for the proposition that main
purposes of tort litigation is giving compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harm,
determining rights, deterring wrongful conduct and vindicating parties).
146 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal?" Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in America Law, 71 B.U.L REV. 193, 231 (1991)
(stating traditional concept that tort law serves to compensate while criminal law serves
to punish and positing that perhaps distinction can be correlated with decline in private
enforcement of criminal law).
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dogmatic separation between the rules and interpretations of tort
and criminal law.147
2. Practical Justifications for the Rise of Criminal Liability of
the Corporation
The previous discussion explains that there are several
theoretical and practical justifications for imposing criminal and
civil liability on non-state actors under transnational law. There
are also practical explanations for the rise of corporate criminal
liability. The expansion of corporate liability may be primarily
due to globalization. The world is growing smaller and
international civil and criminal liability is expanding. Criminal
liability for corporations is justified on a practical level because,
while holding directors and managers liable may punish the
individual, the corporate entity remains free to continue with
profitable misfeasance.148 Criminal sanctions are also justified
because they are a more effective deterrent than civil sanctions,
as well as being reprehensible to potential wrongdoers. 149
Moreover, there are several advantages to imposing criminal
liability on a corporation from the plaintiffs perspective: 1)
Criminal jurisdiction is easier to obtain than a civil action;150 2)
Corporate liability is also more likely to adequately compensate
victims than liability of individuals because the corporate
defendant may have greater assets than an individual;151 3)
Criminal prosecution is less expensive for plaintiffs. While U.S.
civil discovery is perhaps the broadest in the world, its costs may
147 See Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in
International Law: Panel I: Human Rights & Civil Wrongs at Home and Abroad: Old
Problems and New Paradigms: Conceptualizing Violence under International Law: Do
Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 585 (1997) (outlining moral
underpinnings of international tort/crime distinction and noting that international crimes
involve entire community while torts only affect parties involved).
148 See Friedman, supra note 144, at 852 (discussing modern corporation's unique
position as entity separate from its managers and employees and arguing that corporation
can therefore be held criminally responsible for its conduct in same manner as individual
wrongdoer).
149 See Ramasastry, supra note 10, at 153 (explaining that criminal sanctions are
greater deterrent than civil sanctions for corporate criminal liability because criminal
sanctions have much more stigmatizing side effects than do civil sanctions).
150 Id. at 153 (advancing universality principle as granting jurisdiction to national
court regardless of where offense occurred or of the nationality of defendant).
151 See Joseph F.C. DiMento, Gilbert Geis and Julia M. Gelfand, Corporate Criminal
Liability: A Bibliography, 28 W. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (noting that corporations almost
always have more assets than individuals and therefore from a restitution perspective are
better able to compensate victims).
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be born by the litigant.152  For poor plaintiffs, criminal
prosecution may be in practice the only solution - especially
internationally where "winner takes all" is the rule, and the
losing side pays the winner's costs. 153 Finally, it may be difficult
to identify the proper individual defendants in a case of corporate
wrongdoing. For these reasons, corporate criminal liability
serves a complementary role to private liability and corporate
self-regulation.154
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CRIMINAL
ENTERPRISES IN U.S. LAW
Several U.S. criminal laws also include implied civil causes of
action - remedies similar to torts but arising out of criminal law
violations.155 But applying civil causes of action to overseas
conduct is somewhat problematic since foreign legal systems
generally do not recognize punitive damages. While private
claims for compensation arising out of crimes exist in France,
Belgium and Germany (respectively, the action civile and
adhasionsverfahren) punitive damages do not. 156  Punitive
damages are not allowed in the civil law because they result in
overcompensation of plaintiffs.157
152 See George B. Shephard, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly Billing,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 98 (1999) (explaining that broad discovery standards actually
hurt many potential litigants because they raise cost of litigation and therefore deny
many vulnerable groups legal recourse).
153 See Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through
Domestic Litigation, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 401, 411 (2001) (noting that most
countries have 'loser pays" policy in that prevailing party can be compensated for legal
fees by the loser).
154 See Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): Market-Based Remedies for
International Human Rights Violations?, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 103, 120-21 (2004)
(commenting that while codes of conduct or corporate self-regulation alone will not spur
reform of corporate human rights abuses, when combined with binding civil or criminal
law they can be used to promote higher standards of conduct).
155 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (2005) (enumerating both civil and criminal remedies
for violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); see also 17
CFR § 240.10b-5 (2003) (listing civil causes of action).
156 See James Nicholas Boeving, Aggression, International Law, and the ICC: An
Argument for the Withdrawal of Aggression from the Rome Statute, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 557, 607 (2005) (noting that punitive damages are not available in
international civil litigation).
157 See Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tex. 1994) (explaining that tort
law recognizes compensation and not punishment as its objective and therefore, punitive
damages are reserved only for most exceptional cases).
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A. The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) 158
RICO is a U.S. law crafted to fight organized crime which
offers litigants a claim against international tortfeasors.159 It
also offers both criminal and civil remedies, including treble
damages for criminal enterprises.160 It is an open question
whether and to what extent RICO has extraterritorial
jurisdiction. But, if there is extraterritorial jurisdiction for
RICO, then it may be used to vindicate human rights. A brief
analysis of RICO is required to determine the jurisdictional
question of whether the private right to compensation applies
extraterritorially and if so, under what circumstances.
1. Substantive Law: Definition of a RICO Offense
RICO, like the FCPA and SEC Rule 10b-5, is a legal platypus;
it has some features that make it resemble a tort and others that
make it resemble a criminal statute. Whether and when these
statutes have extraterritorial application adds to the confusion.
All three of these statutes offer both criminal and civil
remedies.161
The legislative purpose of RICO is to fight organized criminal
enterprises.1 62 Title 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
158 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2005).
159 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3293, at *66-67 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 22, 2002) (holding that even though RICO is silent on
extraterritorial application, it is clear that foreign corporation is not shielded from
liability merely because of location).
160 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2005) (listing possible criminal penalties, such as fines and
imprisonment for violation of RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2005) (enumerating possible civil
remedies implicit in RICO).
161 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-3 (2005). Subsection (e) lists the criminal penalties and
subsection (d) provides for injunctive relief as a civil remedy to the FCPA. 18 U.S.C. §
1963-1964 (2005). RICO's criminal penalties are provided for in § 1963 and a civil remedy
is listed in § 1964. Notably, a "defendant can be both criminally and civilly liable under
Rule 10-b." Securities Fraud, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 941, 946 (2000).
162 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(1970) (proclaiming that it is "the purpose of this act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States... ").
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pattern of racketeering activity."163 Thus, to make a claim in
RICO, one must prove a pattern of racketeering164 in furtherance
of a criminal conspiracy. Specifically, the plaintiff under § 1962(c)
has the burden of proving: "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity."165
a. "Conduct of an Enterprise"
An enterprise, for RICO purposes, is "a group of persons
associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course
of conduct."166 A person is an "individual or entity capable of
holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."167 Further, a
RICO enterprise "includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity."168
Governmental entities can be enterprises for RICO.169 The
enterprise, however, must be distinct from the "person"
conducting the racketeering activities.170 "[A]lleging a RICO
enterprise that consists merely of a corporate defendant
associated with its own employees or agents carrying on regular
affairs of the defendant" 171 will not satisfy RICO's definition of
enterprise. A parent corporation and two subsidiary corporations
constitute a RICO "enterprise" if the predicate acts were
committed within the scope of the agency relationship.172
Although a RICO "enterprise" cannot generally be comprised of a
163 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2005).
164 See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1985) (discussing
pattern of racketeering as sufficient to establish claim under RICO).
165 See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (noting that plaintiff must allege each of these
elements in order to state a claim).
166 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Big Apple Indus. Bldgs., Inc., 879 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir.
1989) (defining "enterprise" for RICO purposes).
167 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (2000).
168 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2000).
169 See United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 30-33 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing broad
definition of "enterprise" as encompassing governmental entity due to lack of contrary
legislative intent).
170 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000). The act prohibits racketeering activities by "any
person employed by or associated with any enterprise... "Id.
171 Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 344 (2d
Cir. 1994).
172 See Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 93 F.3d 1055, 1064 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying
Riverwoods to NYNEX Group and its three subsidiary corporations), rev'd on other
grounds, 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
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corporation and its employees or subsidiaries, it is possible for
two entities in a principal-agent relationship to constitute
"persons" if the agent-subsidiary is not acting in the scope of the
agency relationship. 173
b. "Through a Pattern"
To prove a RICO claim, the plaintiff must show "a pattern of
racketeering activity" or a conspiracy to commit racketeering
activity.174 A "pattern of racketeering activity" is formed by two
or more acts of racketeering, such as extortion, occurring within
ten years of each other.175 These two or more predicate crimes
must be related to each other, present some level of continuity,
and present a threat of future criminality.176 That is, the plaintiff
must prove "a series of allegedly criminal acts" independent of
the enterprise. 177 To prove the existence of a "pattern" of
"racketeering activity" plaintiffs must prove "that each
defendant... committed... at least two RICO predicate acts,
and that the alleged predicate acts relate to each other and
'amount to, or ... otherwise constitute a threat of, continuing
racketeering activity.'178
c. "Of Racketeering Activity"
Racketeering activities are broadly defined as one of several
substantive criminal offenses in Title 18 of the U.S. Code.179
RICO predicate acts are essentially varieties of extortion whether
by murder, robbery, or threats of violence.' 8 0 These are
173 See Cedric Kushner Promotions v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 165-66 (2001) (suggesting
that in such a situation the two would qualify under RICO as distinct entities).
174 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d) (2000). Subsection (d) makes it unlawful to conspire to
violate the other provisions of the section. Id.
175 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2000) (providing definition of "pattern of racketeering
activity" for purposes of RICO Act).
176 See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237-39 (1989) (noting "it
is not the number of predicates but the relationship that they bear to each other or to
some external organization" that is relevant for RICO purposes).
177 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Big Apple Indus. Bldgs., Inc., 879 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir.
1989) (specifying complaint must independently allege both an enterprise and pattern of
racketeering activity).
178 De Falco v. Dirie, 923 F. Supp. 473, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S.
at 240).
179 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)-(B) (2000) (outlining crimes qualifying as "racketeering
activity").
180 See 18 U.S.C. 1951(b)(2) (2005). Extortion is defined by the act as "the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
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specifically defined in the following provisions: 1) the Hobbs
Act,' 81 2) Title 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a); 3) 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); and, 4)
state law claims. The exercise of federal jurisdiction must be
justified since RICO is a federal statute; therefore, the RICO
offense must also obstruct interstate or international
commerce.18 2 We now look at the elements of each of these four
claims.
First, RICO predicate acts are specifically defined in the Hobbs
Act and include interference with commerce, robbery extortion,
and conspiracy to commit these substantive crimes.18 3 Second, 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) imposes liability in crime and in tort for any
person or group "associated with any enterprise, engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity;"l8 4 for example, criminal enterprises. Third, Under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d), defendants can be liable for conspiracy to
commit a substantive offense, such as an agreement between
defendant and others, to facilitate commission of a violation of §
1962(d),185 although no overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy
must be proven to demonstrate its existence.i8 6 Conspirators do
not have to know each other to be liable for conspiracy under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d).187 Finally, in addition to the various federal
claims (the Hobbs Act and the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1962), a
RICO case can also be based on substantive state law, and
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." Id. It seems logical that an act of
extortion could be furthered through the use of these other crimes listed as predicate acts.
181 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000) (codifying federal crime of racketeering).
182 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000) (requiring this element specifically).
183 Id. Specifically, "whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or
extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to
any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of
this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both." Id.
184 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
185 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2000). This conspiracy provision applies to all of the
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c). Id.
186 See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) (clarifying that § 1962(d)
omitted requirement of an overt act).
187 See United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that it is
not necessary that conspirator knows of all acts done in furtherance of conspiracy for
RICO charge).
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foreign laws as well.188 For example, crimes in Illinois that are
not federal offenses can be the basis for RICO action where there
is a pattern of activity affecting interstate or international
commerce.189
When using state laws as a basis for a RICO action, however,
the federal courts look to the substance of the state law and not
its procedure. United States v. Bagaric provides, "under RICO . .
state offenses are included by generic designation,
references to state law serve [merely] a definitional purpose, to
identify generally the kind of activity made illegal by the federal
statute."190 Thus, state acquittal or procedural defenses will not
preclude a federal charge under RICO,191 even when the
predicate act must "include the essential elements of the state
crime." 192 Although the location of the crime will trigger the
particular state's law to be examined, the relevant information
for a RICO action is the substantive, not procedural, portion of
the state's law.193 RICO can have extraterritorial effect because
only substantive foreign law is applied in the U.S. as the
foundation for a violation of the U.S. domestic RICO statute. 194
188 See, e.g., Orion Tire Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 268 F.3d 1133, 1137
(9th Cir. 2001) (examining facts under RICO, state law, and foreign law claims).
189 See United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 393 (2d Cir. 1985) (explaining that
RICO predicate acts may be acts "chargeable by state law" and that, particularly in this
case, all were New York state offenses).
190 United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 62 (2d Cir. 1983), abrogated on other
grounds by, Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
191 See, e.g., United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1564-65 (2d Cir. 1991) (striking
down defendant's argument regarding Double Jeopardy clause because Congress'
intention in using state law to define predicate acts in RICO was for generic definitory
purposes rather than specific procedural history).
192 United States v. Carillo, 229 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 2000).
193 See Paone, 782 F.2d at 393 (concluding that the court is "satisfied that
Congress did not intend to incorporate the various states' procedural and evidentiary
rules into the RICO statute" and that "[tihe statute is meant to define, in a more generic
sense, the wrongful conduct that constitutes the predicates for a federal racketeering
charge"); see also Coonan, 938 F.2d at 1564 (alluding to Paone and its progeny). But see
Peters v. Welsh Dev. Agency, No. 86 Civ. 2646, 1991 WL 172950, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29,
1991) (asserting that allowing state law charges as predicate acts extends bounds of RICO
too far).
194 See Orion Tire Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 268 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir.
2001) (opening possibility of using foreign law for predicate offenses).
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2. Jurisdiction: Does RICO Have Extraterritorial Effect?
Though it is possible to apply foreign law in the U.S. (i.e.
Chinese law could be the basis of a RICO action)195 that does not
necessarily imply the reciprocal proposition (i.e. U.S. domestic
violations of RICO have extraterritorial effect). RICO is silent
concerning its potential extraterritorial effect. 196 Although a
foreign corporation is not shielded from RICO liability merely
because of its location, 197 the amount of activity a foreign
corporation must maintain in the United States to obtain
jurisdiction for a RICO claim is uncertain. 198 Thus, the key
problem does not seem to be whether RICO can have
extraterritorial effect but rather under what circumstances
would sufficient contacts exist to the U.S. in order to justify the
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over a transaction at least partly
occurring outside the U.S.199
In United States v. Noriega, RICO was found to have
extraterritorial application in the context of illegal drug sales. 200
A later federal district court case held, 201 however, that RICO
does not apply extraterritorially because U.S. legislation is
presumed to have no extraterritorial effect, and none will
ordinarily be inferred absent an explicit congressional
indication. 202 Since cases must be interpreted consistently where
possible, and later cases have made clear that extraterritorial
195 See id. at 1137 (theorizing that Chinese law may be considered when interpreting
intentions of RICO statute).
196 See N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996) (ascertaining
whether Congress, under RICO, intended federal courts to extend jurisdiction over
international controversies because RICO statute is textually silent regarding
extraterritoriality).
197 See Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 479 (2d Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975) (noting proposition that foreign corporations are not immune from RICO liability
because they are not located within the United States (citing United States v. Parness,
503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974))).
198 See N. S. Fin. Corp., 100 F.3d at 1051 (expressing lack of definitive precedent
regarding amounts of activity necessary for RICO subject matter jurisdiction).
199 See id. at 1051-52 (reiterating that extraterritorial jurisdiction is possible, but
must meet standards of "conduct" and "effects" test).
200 United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1516 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (concluding
RICO applied extraterritorially).
201 Jose v. MJV Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349 (D. Or. 1991).
202 See id. at 357 (asserting that unless Congress made its intentions clear within
statutory language, it would not be considered to extend extraterritorially and
emphasizing because RICO is silent on the matter, it should not be considered to extend
extraterritorially).
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jurisdiction under RICO is possible, 203 the better view is to limit
Jose et al. v. M/V Fir Grove to the facts in that case and not to
see it as prohibiting extraterritorial application of RICO in all
cases. This view is supported in U.S. v. Bowman where the court
held that, although extraterritorial jurisdiction may not be
inferred in civil cases, it may be inferred in criminal cases. 204
Essentially, statutes that do not explicitly claim to have
extraterritorial application are presumed to be applicable only
domestically, but in criminal cases that presumption is
rebuttable. 20 5
Courts do have some guidance in determining the
extraterritorial application of RICO by looking to "precedents
concerning subject matter jurisdiction for international securities
transactions and antitrust matters." 206 The appropriate test for
jurisdiction "var[ies] depending on the substantive law to be
applied." 207 Securities fraud can be a RICO predicate act, 208 and
U.S. securities fraud statutes can have extraterritorial effect. 209
In order for subject matter jurisdiction for the extraterritorial
application of RICO, the complaint must pass either the 'conduct'
or 'effects' test used in securities fraud 210 and antitrust cases.
203 Extraterritorial jurisdiction may be established under RICO claims, but delicate
prerequisites must first be solidified. There are two tests that have been developed to
examine whether jurisdiction may be extended extraterritorially: the "effects" test and the
"conducts" test. See generally N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1052 (2d Cir.
1996).
204 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922) (advocating broad
statutory interpretation in federal criminal cases regarding offenses not necessarily
confined to local territory, such as those that may make the United States vulnerable by
acting on the high seas or in foreign countries).
205 See United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 217-18 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(advancing that extraterritorial jurisdiction may be inferred by courts when statutes
represent vulnerabilities to the United States if only construed as permitting domestic
jurisdiction).
206 N. S. Fin. Corp., 100 F.3d at 1052 (recognizing that there is little caselaw within
the circuit regarding extraterritorial application using RICO and that, accordingly, the
court relies on precedent from international securities and antitrust matters).
207 Id. at 1052 (suggesting that substantive law must be carefully scrutinized by
courts to determine whether each particular statute suggests extraterritorial jurisdiction).
208 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (2005) (including "fraud in the sale of securities" in
definition of "racketeering activity" for purposes of RICO).
209 See Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
although the Securities Exchange Act itself does not express extraterritorial jurisdiction,
courts have surmised that it does based upon jurisdictional tests).
210 The court in Alfadda held that the possibility for RICO to extend extraterritorially
should be extended because the act is based upon a pattern of racketeering activity, which
may include securities or antitrust violations. Both securities and antitrust violations
must surpass either the "conduct" or the "effects" test for application of extraterritorial
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However, tests developed in securities and antitrust may not
correspond exactly to RICO because each statute serves a
different purpose. 211
It seems that in order to obtain subject matter jurisdiction for a
RICO claim, the plaintiff must show that either the conduct
"within the United States directly caused the loss" 212 or that "a
predominantly foreign transaction has substantial effects within
the United States."213 The former is known as the "effects test"
and the latter as the "conduct test."214 Although both the
"conduct" and "effects" test arise out of case law that interprets
U.S. Securities laws, they apply to RICO as well. 215
a. The "Conduct" Test
Under the conduct test, federal jurisdiction in securities fraud
cases exists outside U.S. territory only if the conduct "within the
United States directly caused"216 Mere preparation in the United
States alone will not support jurisdiction for the extraterritorial
injury. 217  Alternatively, "actual execution" (e.g., fraudulent
statements made in the U.S.),218 or execution of sales contract
based on overseas fraud would. 219
jurisdiction. Accordingly, RICO must, at least, pass these tests. See Alfadda v. Fenn, 935
F.2d 475, 479 (2d Cir. 1991).
211 See N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1052 (2d Cir. 1996) (qualifying use
of securities and antitrust violations as RICO predicates because tests regarding former
acts were developed specifically with them in mind and noting that because RICO is a
different statute with different congressional intent, it must be approached differently).
212 Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975)).
213 Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1989).
214 See Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (highlighting
two jurisdictional tests).
215 See Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 479 (opening possibility that extraterritorial
jurisdictional tests will be used as predicates for securities and antitrust violations in
RICO violations). But see N. S. Fin. Corp., 100 F.3d at 1052 (distingushing line between
intent for extraterritorial jurisdiction with securities and antitrust violations and intent
in RICO).
216 Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1046 (quoting Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993).
217 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (holding that jurisdiction
will not be taken when acts in country are "merely preparatory or take the form of
culpable nonfeasance and are relatively small in comparison to those abroad").
218 See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (2d
Cir. 1972) (recalling that defendants made telephone calls and mailed fraudulent
statements within the U.S.).
219 See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding
jurisdiction where fraudulent acts were committed in Greece and contracts executed in
New York).
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For example, in Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton fraudulent statements
were made overseas, primarily in Greece. 220 However, several of
the contracts were executed in New York. 221 Further, the
company accused was an American company whose agents
defrauded the foreign plaintiff.222 The court determined that the
U.S. had sufficient interest in the claim because the claim, that
an agent of a U.S. company overseas made fraudulent statements
to a foreign person, if not remedied by exercise of jurisdiction,
would imply corruption of U.S. markets in New York.223 Thus,
the court determined that hearing the claim for the fraudulent
statements in Greece would serve the interests of justice would
be served by protecting the integrity of the U.S. market.224 In
that case, the preparatory acts (fraudulent statements and
conclusion of a series of unfair contracts) were undertaken in
Europe, but the actual execution of the sales-orders occurred in
the U.S.225 It is worth pointing out that interpretative schemes in
one branch of securities law are interpretive aids in
understanding other securities laws.226 The logic of the conduct
test is to prevent "the United States [from being used] as a base
for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even
when these are peddled only to foreigners." 227
b. The "Effects" Test
The effects test dictates that securities fraud statutes "may be
given extraterritorial reach whenever a predominantly foreign
transaction has substantial effects within the United States."228
Extraterritorial effect can be given to U.S. antitrust statutes "if
220 Id. at 1043.
221 Id. at 1044 (highlighting that trading contracts were often executed in New York).
222 Id. at 1043 (recalling that defendant was Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in New York).
223 Id. at 1046 (finding potential use of United States commodities markets as place
to commit improprieties persuasive in determining jurisdiction).
224 Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
foreigners have standing to bring claims of breach of U.S. securities laws).
225 Id. at 1024.
226 Mormels v. Girofinance, S.A., 544 F.Supp. 815, 817 n.8 (1982) (noting proposition
that "securities cases and principles are used as persuasive aids to interpretation of the
C[ommidities] E[xchange] A[ct]") (citing Miller v. New York Produce Exchange, 550 F.2d
762, 769 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 823, 54 (1977) and CFTC v. J.S. Love &
Assoc. Options Ltd., 422 F. Supp. 652, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1976))
227 ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975).
228 N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Consol.
Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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the conduct is intended to and actually does have an effect on
United States imports or exports which the state reprehends."229
The relevant inquiry is whether the antitrust violation "has, or is
intended to have, any anticompetitive effect upon United States
commerce, either commerce within the United States or export
commerce from the United States."230
The rationale behind the application of the effects test to anti-
fraud statutes in securities cases and anti-trust cases is "to
protect domestic... markets from corrupt foreign influences."231
With that teleology232 it seems reasonable that RICO could have
an extraterritorial effect in cases of human rights abuse,
although there is little clear federal authority on the question.
c. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Antitrust Legislation
Antitrust law, like securities law, also has an extraterritorial
effect 233 and can be the basis for a RICO claim;234 therefore, it
seems that the test for the extraterritorial effectiveness of RICO
will be that of the underlying predicate acts. RICO can have
extraterritorial effect where the underlying predicate act,
whether it is securities fraud or anti-trust violations, allows the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 235 To demonstrate this
reasoning a maiore ad minus, 2 36 where a law is derived from a
229 N. S. Fin. Corp., 100 F.3d at 1052 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945)); see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S.
764, 798 (1993) (rejecting argument that international comity prevents U.S. courts from
taking jurisdiction over overseas parties who conspire to restrain illegally interstate or
foreign commerce in the United States).
230 Nat'l Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n., 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981).
231 Madanes v. Madanes, 981 F. Supp. 241, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
232 Teleology, or final causality, is the ultimate reason for a thing's becoming. The
final cause of a child, for example, is an adult. Likewise, the teleology of a law is its
ultimate purpose. When we know a law's reason, the goal it seeks to accomplish, in
addition to its historical or textual interpretation, we can understand that law in its
proper context. Merriam-Webster Online defines teleology as "the fact or character
attributed to nature or natural processes of being directed toward an end or shaped by a
purpose." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/teleology
(last visited Jan. 20, 200).
233 See United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913)
(upholding jurisdiction for violations of Sherman Antitrust Act and Interstate Commerce
Act on shipping routes outside of the U.S.).
234 See Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 477-80 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that foreign
violation of Securities Exchange Act and RICO may serve as basis of subject matter
jurisdiction even though these statutes are silent as to extraterritorial application).
235 See id. at 480. (holding that securities fraud violation may serve as predicate act
justifying RICO claim)
236 Literally, the Latin phrase a maiore ad minus, a simili, a pari means "from the
greater to the lesser, similarities or differences." Sir Edward Coke, A Commentarie Upon
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law that has extraterritorial effect, then the new law by logical
implication must also have extraterritorial effect. Thus, RICO's
criminal provisions certainly apply outside of U.S. territory and it
is likely that RICO's civil provisions do so as well.
d. Should RICO Have Extraterritorial Effect?
While RICO's potential extraterritorial application in certain
circumstances seems clear, the question remains whether it
should be applied in such a manner. Comparing RICO with
Helms-Burton 237 and the FCPA may help to understand this
point. Helms-Burton attempts to remedy Cuban expropriation of
U.S. assets by creating a private cause of action against
successors in interest to expropriated property. 238 Helms-Burton
provides extraterritorial treble damages.239 However, the
underlying claim of recapturing expropriated assets via
successors in interest is much more controversial than RICO. This
is one argument for RICO's extraterritorial application. Helms-
Burton, which is another treble damage statute, goes much
further in exercising U.S. jurisdiction extraterritorially. 240
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act also has extraterritorial
effect.241  It makes bribery of foreign government officials
intended to obtain or retain business 242 a punishable offense in
the U.S. even where the conduct occurred outside of U.S.
territory.243 SEC statutes against securities fraud also have
Littleton, http://www.la.utexas.edulresearchpoltheory/coke/coke.pa0l.c01.s03.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2006). In other words, the greater includes the lesser. Thus, if the
substantive offense has extraterritorial effect then RICO also has extraterritorial
application, at least as to that offense.
237 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD or Helms-Burton) Act of
1996, Pub.L. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified as amended in 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091).
238 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (a) (2005) (providing civil remedy for U.S. nationals whose
property was confiscated by Cuban Government and then sold to third party).
239 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (a)(3)(C) (2005) (delineating recovery scheme which triples initial
damages available in earlier section).
240 See S. Kern Alexander, Trafficking in Confiscated Cuban Property: Lender
Liability Under the Helms-Burton Act and Customary International Law, 16 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 523, 561 (1998) (positing that United States has extended extraterritorial reach under
Helms-Burton to such extent that it violates international law.)
241 See Melysa Sperber, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 679,
680-81 (2002) (commenting that 1998 Amendments to FCPA broadened the Act'sjurisdiction to allow prosecution of foreign offenders).
242 Id. at 686 (stating that FCPA prohibits bribery of foreign government officials in
order to obtain or retain business).
243 Id. at 687 (finding that FCPA covers any act person, foreign or national, who
commits bribery within U.S.).
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extraterritorial effect. This is logical because organized crime,
tax evasion, money laundering, and postal fraud, like classical
pirates, ignore borders. 244 So, why should criminals benefit from
borders they do not respect? Although the court has not decided
this issue, valid reasons exist for applying RICO internationally.
3. Standing (Injury in Fact) and Remedies
a. Standing (injury in fact) to Bring a RICO claim
In order to bring a claim under RICO, the plaintiff must have
suffered an injury-in-fact. This means the plaintiff must have
been "injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of § 1962."245 Courts also use the term standing. The violation of
§ 1962 must have been the proximate cause 246 (e.g., the legal
cause)247 of the injury248 to the business or property of the
plaintiff.249 A predicate act is a proximate cause if it is a
"substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation, and
if the injury is reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural
consequence." 250
b. Remedies under RICO
Once RICO jurisdiction has been established and a judgment
against the plaintiff is entered, the remedial provisions of RICO
come into play. These include treble damages 251 and
forfeiture. 252
244 See Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Crackdown on Money
Laundering: A Comparative Analysis of Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and
Multilateral Policy Reforms, 23 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 263, 265 (2003) (noting
international economic impact of corrupt business practices).
245 Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, 897 F.2d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988)).
246 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) (holding that injuries
proximately caused by forbidden conduct under RICO are compensable).
247 See First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 769 (2d Cir. 1994)
(explaining "proximate" or "legal" cause required in RICO cases).
248 See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 505-06 (2000) (concluding, in congruence with
common-law tort principles that recovery under RICO is limited to injuries caused by
conduct forbidden by RICO).
249 See De Falco v. Dirie, 923 F. Supp. 473, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining how to
satisfy injury to business or property requirement for RICO violation).
250 Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, 897 F.2d 21, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1990) (defining
proximate cause).
251 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2005) (listing civil remedies such as treble damages).
252 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2005) (listing criminal penalties such as forfeiture).
325
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i. Treble Damages
RICO provides for treble damages to be awarded to plaintiffs
(e.g., twice the substantive damages plus the initial damages and
also attorneys fees and court costs) which is similar to certain
tort remedies. 253 RICO also provides for the possibility of prison,
similar to the criminal law. 254 Internationally, punitive damages
are viewed as an aspect of criminal law rather than tort law.255
Civil law systems do not recognize punitive damages in their tort
system.256 Because RICO is probably viewed as a penal statute
rather than a civil statute in terms of international law, courts
are led to question its extraterritorial application due to concerns
over comity.257 Therefore, an argument against applying RICO
internationally is that it is a criminal statute because it provides
for treble damages and imprisonment.258
Since exercise of criminal law overseas is a greater invasion of
the sovereignty of a foreign country courts are less likely to imply
253 RICO provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962
of this chapter. . .may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that
would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish
a violation of section 1962 ... The exception contained in the preceding sentence
does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally convicted in
connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run
on the date on which the conviction becomes final.
18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2005).
254 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2005) (specifying that "whoever violates any provision of
section 1962 of this chapter... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
20 years (or for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the
maximum penalty includes life imprisonment), or both...").
255 See Volkher Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law - Tendencies
Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 105,
106 (2003) (stating that in German law, punitive damages are seen as function of criminal
law because they punish the wrongdoer as opposed to compensating the plaintiff).
256 Punitive damages are not recognized in French law. See C. CIv. § 1382 (1995).
Secton 1382 requires the tortfeasor to simply "make reparation[s];" thus, it suggests that
the tortfeasor is liability for only compensatory damages. Additionally, German civil law
only requires a tortfeasor to "indemnify" the plaintiff. See §§ 249-255 BGB. It defines
"indemnity" as "restor[ing] the condition, which would exist if the circumstance causing
the indemnity had not occurred." Punitive damages for torts are a specificity of the
common law. For an explanation of the evolution of punitive damages in torts see
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 283-99 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
257 See N.S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1052 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that
extraterritorial application of RICO is "delicate work" due to comity concerns).
258 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2005) (allowing for treble damages).
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extraterritorial application of the criminal statute.259 One way
around this jurisdictional objection might be to simply waive
claims for treble damages and imprisonment in international
cases and to argue that the civil portions of RICO are in tort.
While foreign courts such as Germany will not enforce U.S. treble
damages claims, 260 they do enforce U.S. substantive tort law -
even though U.S. compensatory awards are much higher than in
Europe. 261 But in RICO, because the statute contains provisions
for imprisonment, execution of the U.S. judgment overseas would
be even less likely to be obtained than in the case of treble
damages in tort.
ii. Forfeiture
RICO also includes a forfeiture provision wherein any interest
in the enterprise, or any property derived from any illegal acts
will be surrendered to the U.S. government. 262 Again, controlling
precedent seems to be lacking. However, in U.S. v.
Approximately $25,829,681.80 in Funds,263  extraterritorial
application of a federal civil forfeiture statute264  was
permissible. 265 One main argument of the government was based
on an analogy to the domestic application of RICO for civil
forfeitures. 266 Thus, it is very likely that the civil forfeiture
provisions of RICO can have extraterritorial effect. However,
actual enforcement of judgment overseas becomes problematic
because of the possibility of imprisonment and treble damages
259 See N.S. Fin. Corp., 100 F.3d at 1052 (expressing comity concerns over application
of criminal aspects of RICO due to treble damages).
260 The Germans regard such claims as criminal, and not civil, because they lead to
the overcompensation of plaintiffs. See Behr, supra note 255, at 108. 'Thus, to this day,
American punitive damage awards are not enforced in Germany." Id.
261 See George L. Priest, Lawyers, Liability, and Law Reform: Effects on American
Economic Growth and Trade Competitiveness, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 115, 147 (1993) (noting
sexual assault case where German court refused to enforce punitive damages on public
policy grounds, but awarded medical expenses and pain and suffering damages).
262 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2005). 'Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of
this chapter ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years (or
for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty
includes life imprisonment), or both .... " Id.
263 56 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2003).
264 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2005).
265 See Approximately $25,829,681.80 in Funds, 56 Fed. Appx. at 41 (holding that
court had jurisdiction over funds in controversy).
266 See U.S. v. Approximately $25,829,681.80 in Funds, No. 98 Civ. 2682, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18499, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (using RICO analogy to establish
jurisdiction over forfeiture action at bar).
328 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:2
against the defendant. These features transform what the
common law regards as a civil statute into what the civil law
regards as a criminal law, with a correspondingly increased
infringement of national sovereignty. Thus treble damages
forfeiture statutes might be unenforceable overseas, where
ordinary damages would be.
c. RICO in the Context of the ATCA
As earlier noted, RICO has been invoked in the context of the
ATCA and TVPA.267 Its applicability in this context has not, to
the best of the author's knowledge, been determined. For
example, RICO was invoked, especially before the trial court, in
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.268 In Wiwa, the plaintiff argued
that the defendant's actions were in furtherance of a criminal
conspiracy. 269 The plaintiff alleged that that Shell hired and
bribed Nigerian officials to intimidate opponents with violence
and to corrupt the law to the profit of Shell. The RICO claim was
not addressed in the Wiwa appeal as the case was remanded for
further proceedings. 270 The court did note, however, that as to
forum non conveniens a foreign forum was still adequate despite
the absence of similar conspiracy statute in the foreign
jurisdiction. 271 RICO was also invoked by plaintiffs in Doe v.
Unocal272 for reasons similar to Wiwa. Namely, that Unocal
hired security forces of the government of Myanmar (Burma) to
intimidate and enslave indigenous persons, to force them to flee
from oil fields and to force them to work as slave labour - all of
which profited Unocal. 273 But, in Unocal the four-year statute of
limitations for a RICO claim had passed. Consequently the
RICO claim was dismissed. The plaintiff in Unocal could have -
but did not - argue that the statute of limitation should have
been tolled ("put on hold" so to speak) under the doctrine of
267 See supra text accompanying notes 79-80 (discussing RICO in the context of
ATCA).
268 226 F.3d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing trial level proceeding).
269 See id. at 92-93 (describing facts of case).
270 See id. at 108 (remanding case for further proceedings).
271 See id. at 101 (citing PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65,
74 (2d Cir. 1998)).
272 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 (2000) (stating plaintiffs
allegation of RICO violation).
273 See id. at 1295-1303 (describing Unocal's relationship with Burmese security
forces that utilized forced labor).
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equitable tolling. Equity may toll a federal statute of limitations
where defendant's wrongful conduct prevented plaintiff from
asserting the claim or where extraordinary circumstances outside
the plaintiffs control made it impossible assert the claim in
time. 274 Not having argued for equitable tolling their claim for
RICO was time-barred.
B. Anti-Bribery Laws
1. Anti-Bribery Laws In International Law
Internationally, efforts to combat corruption are expressed in
at least two regional anti-corruption conventions sponsored by
the Organization of American States (OAS),275 and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).276 The OECD Convention was signed on November 21,
1997 by the twenty-six member countries of the OECD and by
five non-member countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile
and the Slovak Republic. Further, human rights implicate the
various Bretton-Woods institutions, 277 such as the International
274 See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1549 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (discussing
recognition and application of equitable tolling of statutes of limitations with respect to
federal claims where it is in the interest of justice), pet. for extradition sub nom. In re
Requested Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 679-80 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(granting Argentina's request for respondent's extradition on thirtynine murder charges,
also granting extradition on forgery charge, but denying petition for writ of habeas
corpus), reconsideration granted in part and denied in part, 694 F. Supp. 707, 712 (N.D.
Cal.1988) (granting leave to file Second Amended Complaint including allegations of
"Disappearance and Presumed Summary Execution" and 'Torture or other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment").
275 Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention] (creating treaty
among Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Hondura, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Pery, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela).
276 Argentina-Brazil-Bulgaria-Chile-Slovak Republic-Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development: Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter
Convention Combating Bribery] (stating its purpose to criminalize bribery because it
undermines both good governance and economic development, as well as, distorts
international competitive conditions).
277 See Breton Woods Project, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/project/index.s
html (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (stating "Bretton Woods Project operates as a networker,
information-provider, media informant and watchdog to scrutinize and influence the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund."); see also International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html]menu3/b/a-cescr.htm (providing each state party will "take
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation" to achieve
rights recognized by Covenant). See generally Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in
a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 273, 304-05 (2002) (suggesting that in
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Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), also known as
the World Bank Group (WB),278 and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), 279 which also opposes corruption and seeks to find
methods to solve it: these anti-corruption treaties include
prohibitions against bribery.
2. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
a. Introduction
Under American law, companies that commit bribery violate
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)280 and
regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).281
For example, SEC regulations make secret bank accounts illegal
for use in bribery as a contravention of the requirement of
complete and accurate financial disclosure under the SEC's
rules.282 A convention similar to the FCPA exists and applies to
members of the EU and its associated states in the third world
under the Cotonou Agreement. 283 Bribery may also be a violation
of international law. 284
accordance to International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art.2(1),
voting in World Bank or International Monetary Fund for human rights programs
promoting regression would violate voters' obligations).
278 See Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 347 (2000) (discussing World Bank Group's involvement in
combating corruption under international law).
279 See id. at 399-400 (stating that World Bank and International Monetary Fund
took active roles against corruption in mid 1990's only after emergence of anti-corruption
initiatives).
280 Foreign Corrupt Practices (FCPA) Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(1977) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 so that those individuals paying
foreign officials and other foreign persons are required to maintain accurate records).
281 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (2005) (mandating that national securities exchange
members shall keep current employment records including any arrests or indictment for
bribery).
282 See Posadas, supra note 278, at 346 (reiterating Security Exchange Commission's
contention that unaccountably distributing money abroad through "secret slush funds"
contravenes United States securities law, which requires public companies to file accurate
financial statements).
283 Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and its Member
States, of the Other Part, Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, Chapter 1 art. 1, art. 3,)
(stating "good governance, which underpins the ACP-EU Partnership, shall underpin the
domestic and international policies of the Parties and constitute a fundamental element of
this Agreement. The Parties agree that only serious cases of corruption, including acts of
bribery leading to such corruption, as defined in Article 97 constitute a violation of that
element.").
284 See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual
and Collective Human Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime Under
International Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 149, 155-56 (2000) (arguing that Article Three of
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The FCPA, like the Convention on Bribery, 285 makes the worst
instances of bribery illegal. The FCPA regulates illegal activity
by U.S. companies outside of U.S. territory. It criminalizes
bribery of foreign government officials involving U.S.
corporations outside the United States by making such conduct a
punishable offense within the U.S.,286 where such bribery is
intended to obtain or retain business. 287 Liability for violations of
the FCPA generally consist of fines, which are determined
according to guidelines, 288 although an indictment can result in
suspension of the right to do business with the federal
government, or result in suspension of export licenses for
military equipment.28 9
b. Does the FCPA Imply a Private Cause of Action?
The explicit remedy of the FCPA is that the Attorney General
can sue for injunction and obtain civil or criminal penalties. 290 As
to whether there is an implied private right of action against a
company guilty of bribery within the FCPA, the Federal Circuit
in Scientific Drilling Int'l, Inc. v. Gyrodata291 determined that
there is none. The court noted, however, that the legislative
Convention Combating Bribery proscribes intentionally receiving undue advantage from
foreign public officials).
285 Convention Combating Bribery, supra note 276 (criminalizing bribery of foreign
public officials).
286 See Morgan & O'Grady, supra note 243 (advancing that regardless of whether
companies are publicly traded, they are prohibited from bribing foreign officials to gain or
retain business).
287 See Sperber, supra note 241, at 686 (furthering it is also illegal to bribe foreign
government officials for purpose of directing business to another person under FCPA).
288 See id. at 699 (delineating penalties for bribing foreign officials and citing example
as those who willfully violate FCPA accounting provisions may be punished by fines up to
$ 1,000,000 and may be jailed for up to ten years).
289 See id. at 700 (warning that a likely result of a violation of the FCPA is debarment
before several government agencies).
290 See Scientific Drilling Int'l, Inc. v. Gyrodata Corp., No. 90-1077, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20790, at *8 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 1999) (explaining that Congress created
enforcement scheme for FCPA and gave Attorney General authority to file actions for
injunctive relief, civil, or criminal penalties).
291 Id. at *7 (dismissing Gyrodata Corp's counterclaim because FCPA does not grant
private cause of action).
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history on that point is in fact unclear. 292 There is evidence both
for and against a finding of a private remedy under the FCPA.293
The court's reasoning in Scientific Drilling seems tautological.
The court argues that the FCPA creates no implicit private cause
of action because there is no explicit text to that end.294 The
illogic is further demonstrated in the court's argument that a
private cause of action would be "inconsistent" with the FCPA,
even though the FCPA explicitly provides the possibility of civil
penalties. 295 In dicta, the Scientific Drilling court also noted that
even if an implied remedy were found, practical facts would block
its application. Although an illegal contract can constitute
commercial activity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act,2 96 and can be the basis for a finding of jurisdiction under the
FCPA,297 the equitable doctrine of clean hands would bar
recovery.298 There is a problem with this justification of the court
for its decision. Unless a statute states otherwise, its remedies
are legal not equitable. 299 "Unclean hands" is a doctrine based in
292 See id. at *7-*8 (explaining that legislative history of FCPA gives credence both to
permitting private claims, as well as prohibiting them, and, therefore, it does not assist
discovery of congressional intent).
293 See id. at *7 (acknowledging that defendant's legislative history argument is not
conclusive as FCPA's legislative also offers equal support for opposite contention).
294 See id. at *8-*9 (finding that lack of creation of explicit private cause of action
under FCPA is conclusive evidence that Congress meant to exclude such right).
295 Scientific Drilling Int'l, Inc. v. Gyrodata Corp., No. 90-1077, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20790, at *8 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 1999) (explaining irreconcilability of private cause
of action under FCPA due to its explicit text granting right to bring suit to Attorney
General).
296 United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 1603(d)-(e) (1988),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edulfaculty/ddcaron/Documents/RPID2ODocument
s/rp04039.html (defining international commercial activity as "regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act" where the United
States has substantial contact with another nation).
297 See Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that illegal contract was actionable pursuant to Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act because it constituted commercial activity), amended by No. 98-55456, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 20687, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2000) (noting definition of "commercial
activity" in previous case was erroneous since Supreme Court ruled that "question is not
whether the foreign government is acting ... with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign
activities").
298 Id. at 876-77 (explaining that doctrine of unclean hands "closes the doors of
equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he
seeks relief, however improper may have been the behaviour of the defendant").
299 See Time Warner Cable of NYC v. Kline Davis and Mann, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 2897,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18280, at *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating statutory damages are
punitive and are, thus, legal, not equitable, remedies).
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equity.300 Even if the plaintiff had invoked equity, and thus
permitted the court to apply the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands to prohibit a particular case from going forward, that is
not an argument for all cases to be categorically rejected from the
outset. The court in Scientific Drilling makes basic errors in logic
and law that could, and in fact, should be easily overturned.
The reasoning of the court in Scientific Drilling is
unconvincing. Better arguments reaching the same result could
have been found. For example, under a plain meaning, or "black
letter" interpretation, the statute was unambiguous. Thus, there
was no need to imply meanings not facially evident. The court
could have reasoned that the express remedy excluded all other
implicit remedies. Instead, the court in Scientific Drilling
struggles, perhaps unconvincingly, with legislative history it
considers ambiguous. 301 The court noted the statements of the
House committee report, which stated "[tihe committee intends
that courts shall recognize a private cause of action based on this
legislation".302 However, Senator Tower contradicted the House
committee report, as did the statements of Representative
Devine, also a member of the conference committee. 303 Rejecting
the contradictory statements, the court concludes with a
tautology. The court explains that there is no implicit remedy
because the remedy is not explicitly stated.304 This is based on a
questionable teleology; namely, that the statute aims at
deterrence not compensation. The teleological argument,
however, is not based on legislative intent but rather the
inference of the court. The court holds that the detailed
enforcement scheme did not explicitly include a private
remedy. 305 That is, of course, an expressio unius306 argument;
300 See Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244 (1933)
(explaining that fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence is that plaintiffs have
"clean hands" before coming into court).
301 See Scientific Drilling Int'l, Inc. v. Gyrodata Corp., No. 90-1077, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20790, at *7-* 8 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 1999) (acknowledging that one can opt to use
legislative history of FCPA to support existence of private rights of action under FCPA).
302 Id. at *7 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 10 (1977)).
303 Id. at *8 (arguing that FCPA is for Securities and Exchange Commission and
Justice Department to enforce with no right to a private cause of action (citing 123 Cong.
Rec. 38, 778 (1977)).
304 Id. at *8-*9 (stating that FCPA's structure, which consists of detailed
enforcement schemes, tends to negate possibility of implicit remedies).
305 Id. at *8 (finding that lack of explicit private remedy implies that no private right
was intended).
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however, the court does not appear to recognize this or use the
term. For these reasons, it would be possible in future litigation
to limit or reverse Scientific Drilling and find an implied right of
action similar to that in SEC Rule 10b-5, which addresses stock
fraud. Alternatively, Congress could simply amend the FCPA to
specifically provide a private cause of action.3 07
Presently, however, individuals can call the attention of the
government to violations of the law,308 but enforcement of the
FCPA is only possible via government prosecution.309 Private
parties cannot ordinarily bring suit under the FCPA,310 although
an FCPA claim may be evidence of a pattern of racketeering
necessary to support a RICO claim.31i
c. Jurisdiction
The FCPA is an extraterritorial application of U.S. law, unlike
the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victims Protection Act.312
306 Expressio unius is defined as a "canon of construction holding that to express or
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 265 (2d
pocket ed. 2001).
307 See Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Right
of Private Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 216 (1994) (explaining that government agencies
have failed to enforce the vague terms of FCPA and that a possible solution would be to
create private cause of action for general public for violations of Act).
308 In a similar context, Robert J. Liubicic describes the former Secretary of Labor's
recognition that private enforcement via private action may be more effective since it
relies on the self interest of the corporation and argues that corporations can be
encouraged to compete against each other through the pointing out of their competitors'
human rights violations. See Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes Of Conduct And Product
Labelling Schemes: The Limits And Possibilities Of Promoting International Labor Rights
Trough Private Initiatives, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 111, 121-22 (1998).
309 See Sperber, supra note 241, at 692 (explaining that the DOJ and SEC are "solely
responsible" for enforcing FCPA).
310 See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1027-30 (6th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that private action is not recognized under FCPA as it is inconsistent with its
legislative scheme, it is not in congressional intent behind enactment of FCPA, and the
FCPA provides adequate means of redress in the private realm).
311 See Envtl. Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1063-64 (3d Cir.
1988) (allowing evidence of violations of the FCPA admissible for evidence of
racketeering); see also United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 334, 339 (D.
Conn. 1990) (holding, as valid, violations of the Travel Act based upon violations of
FCPA); Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 90 Cal. App. 4th 902, 909 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) (finding permissible private unfair competition claims based upon allegations
of FCPA violations).
312 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001) (giving US district courts original jurisdiction for torts
committed in violation of laws of nations or treaties by aliens and allowing civil suit for
damages against individuals under actual or apparent authority of foreign nations that
subject individuals to torture or extrajudicial killing).
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The FCPA has incited some objection internationally313 as an
invasion of the sovereignty of other countries. Those objections,
however, are not well founded. In fact, the FCPA is not so
unusual; similar legislation also exists under regional 314 and
international law. 315 For example, the European Union 316 also
has anti-bribery legislation 317 and the United Nations has
entered a resolution of the General Assembly to curb corruption
and bribery.318 Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider the
jurisdictional aspects of the FCPA to determine whether there is
any substance to the critique.
The exercise of jurisdiction by U.S. courts over companies
outside of U.S. territory, whether for violations of SEC disclosure
laws or violations the FCPA,319 raises the same jurisdictional
problems found elsewhere in the case of tort liability in the U.S.
for torts committed outside of U.S. territory under either the
Alien Tort Claims Act or the Torture Victims' Protection Act. In
SEC v. Montedison, S.p.A.,320 an Italian corporation was
prosecuted by the SEC under 5 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
313 See Christopher J. Duncan, The 1998 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments:
Moral Empiricism or Moral Imperialism?, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POLY J. 16, *1-*5 (2000)
(stating that objection stems from different customs and values in other nations, such as
gift giving in Asian countries).
314 See Inter-American Convention, supra note 198, at 724, 729-30 (providing
agreement, among Central and South American countries, to establish measures
preventing corruption, including bribery, and allowing each member state to establish
jurisdiction for offenses committed in its territory or offenders located in its territory).
315 See Convention Combating Bribery, supra note 273, at 1, 4 (providing criminal
penalties among agreeing countries for bribery of foreign officials in international
business transactions).
316 See Sperber, supra note 241, at 696 (noting that European Union has adopted
"Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union," prohibiting bribery of
public officials within European Union).
317 But see Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through The World
Trade Organization, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 305, 306 (1997) (describing that problem
with current international laws against bribery is that most countries have laws
prohibiting payment of bribes to its officials, but only two countries make it illegal to
make transactional bribes).
318 See Sperber, supra note 241, at 695-96 (describing that objective of UN
resolutions is to have its member states criminalize payment of bribes and to deny tax
deductibility of bribes).
319 See H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?,
26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 239, 297-302 (2001) (explaining that 1998 FCPA
amendments give US extraterritorial jurisdiction, but such jurisdiction must be exercised
with reasonableness, taking into account foreign states interests).
320 SEC v. Montedison, S.p.A., Lit. Release No. 15164, 1996 WL 673757 (D.D.C.
1996).
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and 78ff321 for violations of the FCPA, for acts wholly undertaken
in Italy. 322 In that case, defective internal accounting led to
failure to report bribery of Italian officials in Italy and
ultimately, the company was held liable. While there are many
procedural, jurisdictional, and prudential obstacles in exercising
"long arm" (ex orbitante) jurisdiction, U.S. exercise of "long arm"
jurisdiction overseas seems to be a part of the current
international legal landscape. 323
Although jurisdictional obstacles are not necessarily going to
block application of the FCPA outside American territory, there
are some loopholes in the FCPA, which allow substantive acts to
escape liability. Not all acts of bribery are illegal under the
FCPA.324 The FCPA does, however, establish accounting
requirements for companies registered with the SEC,325
effectively granting the SEC new regulatory powers outside of
U.S. territory326 with far reaching implications. 327 While the
FCPA is functionally enforceable, it raises jurisdictional
questions; namely, when may an extraterritorial transaction or
defendant be brought before a U.S. court. Those questions can be
partially answered by the fact that the SEC does not compel all
companies to register, but only requires registration for publicly
traded companies in the United States.328 Therefore, companies
321 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1998).
322 See Montedison, 1996 WL at (explaining the charges against Montedison were,
among other things, falsifying documents to artificially inflate company's financial
statements).
323 See Symposium, International Business Law: E-Commerce and the Impact of
Globalization on the Law, 8 NEw ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 19, 27-30 (2002) (outlining
six basis for establishing jurisdiction of extranationals under international law, several of
which bear resemblance to the concept of long arm jurisdiction).
324 See H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?,
26 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 239, 289 (2001) (acknowledging that not all payments to
officials are prohibited by the FCPA but rather only payments intended to secure markets
or gain other improper advantages are prohibited).
325 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1998) (outlining accounting standards for persons and
businesses involved in secutities exchange).
326 See SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 747 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(commenting that the FCPA gives the SEC greater involvement in all activities of the
corporation).
327 See Barbara Crutchfield et al., Responsibilities of Domestic Corporate
Management Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 865, 880
(1980) (positing that the "SEC may be changing from an agency that chiefly regulates the
securities markets to a wide-reaching federal corporations commission').
328 See 69 Am Jur 2d SECURITIES REGULATION -FEDERAL § 577 (finding "the
Exchange Act registration requirements apply, generally, to publicly-traded securities
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benefiting from trading in U.S. markets should not be surprised
when that includes regulation by the U.S. laws. Thus,
jurisdiction for the FCPA (and, by extension, the Securities and
Exchange Act) may be considered universal jurisdiction under
the protective principle. 329
d. Conclusion
Unilateral remedies to criminal activity, such as the FCPA, are
generally criticized. 330 Multilateral remedies, however, do not
seem any more or less effective in reducing the worst instances of
bribery. The various anti-bribery conventions and federal laws
are a small step in the direction of transparent markets, which
also respect human rights.
CONCLUSION
Corporations can be held liable either as principals or
accomplices for activity overseas which is against U.S. law,
international law, and violations of foreign domestic law.
Violations of criminal law often include civil damages as a
remedy and/or imply violations of tort law. This article has tried
to outline some of the problems and possibilities in bringing
extraterritorial criminal law to bear on corporations. As so often
is the case in criminal law if prosecutors wish to bring the power
of the state to bear they can, but they must be aware of the limits
on the exercise of their power, not the least of which is their
limited resources. Hopefully, this outline of possible remedies
will stretch those resources a bit into creative attacks on
wrongful activity Salus Reipublicae.331
and require current information to be available to the marketplace in which such
securities are traded").
329 Brown, supra note 324, at 258-59 (acknowledging that Congress must address
issue of bribery internationally if it were to have any effect).
330 See Diane P. Caggiano, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Case for
Multilateral Cooperation, 5 N. ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 277 (1999), available at
http://www.nesl.edu/intljournal/vol5/caggiano.htm (delineating the criticisms of the FCPA
such as problems with enforcement, cost of compliance, vagueness, among others).
331 For the health of the republic.

